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Abstract 
This paper investigates the impact of energy policies on the export performance of firms. There 
has been a long policy debate on potentially negative impacts of cost-increasing energy policies 
on international competitiveness. We use firm-level data from three countries with similar 
industry structure but different energy policies: Germany, Switzerland, and Austria. We rely on 
firm manager assessments on the relevance of energy policy (in terms of taxes, regulations, 
standards, subsidies and demand stimulation) for their firm operation and link data on the 
adoption and development of new energy technologies. Regression analyses and matching 
approaches both show very few impacts of energy policy on export performance, suggesting that 
either policy impacts on firms’ cost are negligible in the period of study (2012 to 2014) or likely 
negative impacts are balanced by the adoption of new technology.  
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1 Introduction 
There is a long debate on the role of energy policy for firm competitiveness. On the one 
hand, energy policy is often seen as a factor that can increase production costs and lower 
international competitiveness. This view is particularly linked to energy policy that aims at 
reducing environmental impacts of energy consumption, e.g. through energy taxes, regulation, 
emission trade schemes or measures to raise energy efficiency or switching to renewable energy 
sources (Jaffe et al. 1995). On the other hand, energy policy might provide a dynamic 
comparative advantage, if firms learn early to respond to future challenges in energy supply and 
use. This perspective is linked to the so-called Porter Hypothesis (Porter 1990, Porter and van der 
Linde 1995). It stresses a likely positive role of environmental policy on firm competitiveness, if 
policy encourages innovation and the adoption of new technologies, giving firms a head 
advantage over competitors.  
Most studies that deal with the relation between energy-related policies and 
competitiveness focus on environmental policy in general, and often on regulations of end-of-
pipe approaches to reduce environmental externalities of energy production and consumption 
(see Cohen and Tobb 2015, Horvathova 2010, Iraldo et al. 2011). This study focuses on energy 
policy, which is a policy field that touches both environmental policy (reducing negative 
environmental externalities) and resource policy (securing sufficient supply of resources at 
affordable cost). Energy policy does not only affect firms through higher costs for complying 
with policy regulation but may also provide competitive advantages, if policy results in lower 
costs of energy use, e.g. by increasing efficiency or switching energy production to sources with 
a slower increase in price.  
The main interest of this paper is on competitiveness impacts of energy policy, using 
export performance as a key indicator for international competitiveness of firms. We compare 
firms from three European countries that are characterised by similar economic structures but 
somewhat different approaches in energy policy: Germany, Switzerland, and Austria. All three 
countries are highly open and highly internationalised economies with a strong manufacturing 
sector, including some highly energy-intensive production. Policy debates in all three countries 
often highlight the role of energy costs as a main determinant of international competitiveness. 
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This is particularly true in Germany where the government provides subsidies for the adoption of 
renewable energy production that are financed through higher electricity prices.  
We employ a broad concept of energy policy, including energy taxes, energy-related 
regulation, energy-related standard setting and voluntary agreements, government subsidies for 
developing or adopting ‘green’ energy technologies (which either increase energy efficiency or 
promote the use of renewable energy sources), and demand-side impacts of policy such as 
demand for energy-efficient products. In contrast to other firm-level studies, we measure the 
relevance of energy policy through a firm-specific assessment for each policy area, hence 
avoiding a selection bias if policy impact is only measured for firms directly affected by policy 
(see Rexhäuser and Rammer 2014). We consider both (potentially negative) cost-related and 
(potentially positive) technology-related impacts of energy policy. The empirical analysis rests 
on a unique firm-level data set. Based on a common methodology and a uniform questionnaire, a 
survey of a representative sample of manufacturing and service firms from Germany, 
Switzerland, and Austria has been conducted in 2015. The data allow both to identify the role of 
different energy policy approaches for firm operations, and the development and adoption of 
green energy technologies.  
We employ both standard regression modelling techniques and a semi-parametric matching 
approach and perform a series of robustness checks. All results indicate that energy policies do 
not significantly affect the export performance of firms, neither positive nor negative. We also do 
not find country-specific differences in the impacts of energy policy. Our results suggest that 
potential negative effects from cost increase balance out with potential positive impacts from 
technology adoption triggered by energy policy. However, the results suffer from a cross-section 
approach. Since energy policy in all three countries has been following a rather stable approach 
over the past fifteen years or so, it is highly likely that firms have adjusted to this policy 
environment so that no policy impacts can be observed in the short time window we have been 
looking at (2012 to 2014). 
2 Hypotheses 
Energy policy in Europe is by and large following three main objectives: decreasing the 
environmental impact of energy production and consumption by shifting energy sources towards 
low-carbon or no-carbon sources; increasing the efficiency of energy consumption; and securing 
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a stable supply of energy. These policy goals often come at higher costs for energy users. This is 
particularly the case in Germany today. Government support for carbon-free, renewable energy 
sources (wind, solar) is funded by increasing energy prices (EEG). In addition, energy taxes are 
used to stimulate a more efficient use of energy while regulations (e.g. emission limits for 
production activities) force firms to use up-to-date technologies. In order to secure a stable 
energy supply, reserve capacities are built up, the cost of which is allocated to energy prices. The 
result of these policies is higher energy costs for firms which may reduce the competitiveness of 
their products particularly on international markets, where they have to compete over firms 
operating under a different energy policy setting. 
But Porter and van der Linde (1995) stressed that such policies do not necessarily have to 
harm industry. They argue that energy policy (or environmental policy in general) can have 
positive impacts on competitiveness by urging firms to adopt new technologies early that later 
become a global standard (lead-time advantages). In addition, energy policies can promote 
innovation and enhance competitiveness by reducing uncertainty as regulation and standards can 
narrow the scope of future technology development. By generating higher demand for green 
technology they provide additional incentives for technology producers, while mobilising parallel 
innovation activities by many firms will increase knowledge spillovers.  
In this paper, we attempt to analyse the impacts of energy policy on firm competitiveness 
while considering the role of green energy technology adoption. We focus on export performance 
as a measure of firm competitiveness. A firm’s export performance informs about the 
competitiveness of products on markets where firms that operate under different energy policy 
environments meet. In case a national energy policy raises production costs of firms higher than 
energy policies of other countries do, export performance will worsen. However, if national 
energy policies stimulate the development and adoption of green energy technologies, positive 
effects on exports may emerge, either through providing an innovation advantage on export 
markets, or through lowering energy costs (Ambec et al. 2013).  
Figure 1 illustrates the relations between energy policy, green energy technologies, and 
export performance. We distinguish five types of energy policies: (a) energy-related taxes and 
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fees; (b) regulations on the energy use such as emission ceilings or emission certificates1; (c) 
standards and voluntary agreements on energy technologies, energy-efficiency goals or emission 
goals; (d) subsidies for developing and adopting green energy technologies; and (e) policies that 
raise demand for energy-efficient products or products based on green energy. While the first two 
types of policies are likely to raise a firm’s unit costs and hence limit export performance, the last 
two policies tend to promote exports by either increasing energy-efficiency or by increasing sales 
of products related to green energy technologies. For standards and voluntary agreements, the 
likely effect on firms’ costs is ambiguous and will depend on the exact nature of standards and 
voluntary agreements. Standards can reduce uncertainty and lower adoption costs for the firm but 
may also induce adaptation costs to comply with new standards. Voluntary agreements may be 
designed in a way that the costs for firms to comply with the targets set in these agreements are 
minimised compared to alternative mechanisms for meeting the targets. 
Energy policy can positively affect the development of new green energy technologies as 
well as the adoption of such technologies (see Jaffe and Palmer 1997, Gallagher et al. 2012, Linn 
2008, Newell et al. 1999, Popp et al. 2010, Wevant 2011). Technology development and 
adoption may be aimed at complying with regulation requirements or reducing energy demand in 
order to limit energy tax burden (see Ley et al. 2016, Horbach et al. 2012). At the same time, 
standards, voluntary agreements and subsidies may also spur both the development of new 
technologies and their adoption. Demand for energy-efficient products may directly stimulate the 
development of such products, but may also have an impact on adoption of green energy 
technologies if a greener (more energy-efficient) production of products is valued by customers. 
With respect to export performance, the development of green energy technologies can 
provide an export advantage if this technology is demanded in other countries to meet similar 
energy policy targets. But if energy policy favours idiosyncratic technologies, there might be a 
negative export impact. Following the analysis of Beise and Rennings (2005), we expect a 
positive influence on export performance. For the adoption of green energy technologies, a 
positive impact on exports may mainly occur if firms’ become more cost competitive as a result 
from increased energy efficiency. But green energy technology adoption may also have a direct 
                                                 
1 In the period covered by this study, which is 2012 to 2014, the European carbon trading scheme had little impacts 
on energy costs of firms owing to the abundance of carbon certificates and the resulting low price for carbon 
emission rights. 
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positive effect on export performance if firms can benefit from offering products based on ‘green 
technologies’. There might be a negative impact, however, if the costs of adoption are higher 
than the gains from green produced products, e.g. if firms will have to increase product prices to 
fund adoption and price elasticity of demand is high. Hence the direct effect of energy 
technology adoption on export performance remains ambiguous. 
Figure 1: Conceptual framework of the relations between energy policies, green energy 
technologies, and export performance 
Energy Policies
- Energy-related taxes
- Regulations on energy use (e.g. emission ceilings)
- Standards/voluntary agreements for energy technologies
- Subsidies for green energy technologies
- Demand for energy-efficient/green products
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Figure 1 suggests that energy policy will have a positive impact on export performance if it 
stimulates firms to develop and/or adopt green energy technologies, provided that technology 
adoption lowers energy costs more than a corresponding rise in energy costs due to policy. 
Contrary, energy policy may negatively affect export performance, if it does not lead to the 
adoption of more energy-efficient technologies but only raises energy costs of firms. From 
Figure 1 it is also obvious that the positive and negative impacts of energy policies may balance 
out. This gives our three main hypotheses: 
H1a: Energy policy has a negative impact on export performance if (all other things 
being equal) it raises unit costs of firms, e.g. through taxes or regulatory requirements. 
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H1b:  Energy policy has a positive impact on export performance if (all other things 
being equal) it lowers unit costs of firms, e.g. through subsidies or raising demand. 
H2:  Energy policy has a positive impact on export performance if (all other things 
being equal) energy policy stimulates firms to develop or adopt green energy technologies. 
H3:  Energy policy has a neutral impact on export performance if (all other things being 
equal) an increase in energy costs is balanced by a higher energy-efficiency as a result of energy 
technology adoption. 
Given the variety of energy policies it is unlikely to identify a single policy impact since 
the different types of policy intervention—taxes, regulation, standards, voluntary agreements and 
demand incentives—are likely to have different impacts on technology adoption and energy 
prices. In addition, policy impacts will differ by country as countries have implemented different 
types of energy policies. In order to investigate these impacts, we first run regression analysis 
and interact energy policy variables with country and with the firm’s energy technology adoption 
and development activities. In a second step, we perform a matching analysis and compare the 
export performance of similar firms from each country that are similarly affected by energy 
policy and show the same energy technology adoption and development activities. 
3 Energy Policy in Germany, Austria and Switzerland 
Energy policies differ significantly across the three countries considered in this study. in 
Germany, energy policy has been characterized in the past 25 years by a strong focus on 
promoting renewable energies (Lehr and Lutz 2016). Renewable energy sources, particularly 
biomass, solar and wind energy, are expected to substitute electric energy production from 
nuclear power which is to fade out by 2022. At the same time, a growing share of renewable 
energy sources should help reaching the ambitious low-carbon targets of the German government 
(-40% by 2020 as compared to the 1990 level, -80% by 2050; see BMWi 2012, Lutz et al. 2014, 
Pregger et al. 2013). The Federal Government has introduced a series of laws and regulations to 
stimulate the shift in energy sources towards renewable energy and higher energy efficiency. In 
1991, the Electricity Feed-in Act obliged electric utility companies to take electric energy from 
renewable sources at a guaranteed feed-in tariff from local and regional renewable energy 
producers. In 2000, the Act was succeeded by the Renewable Energy Act. The fixed feed-in tariff 
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was set at a level that guaranteed profitable production and was reduced in regular intervals in 
order to stimulate efficiency improvements (Büsgen and Dürrschmidt 2009). The additional costs 
for utility companies are passed on to consumers (both households and enterprises) through a 
special item (renewable energy surcharge) in the electricity bill (Nolden 2013). Energy-intensive 
industries as well as firms with substantial own electricity production are partly exempted from 
the surcharge. For producers of renewable energy technologies, the legislation provided them 
with a home market advantage and led to the emergence of an innovative industry (Cantner et al. 
2016, Lauber and Jacobsson 2016, Yu et al. 2016, Welfens and Lutz 2012). For electricity 
consuming firms, the renewable energy policy in Germany resulted in a constant increase in 
electricity prices and provided an incentive to invest into own electricity producing facilities 
based on renewable energy (particularly photovoltaic energy and biomass) (Lehr et al. 2009, 
2012, Lipp 2007, Frondel et al. 2010). The trend to increasing electricity prices has been 
reinforced by an ecological tax reform in 1999, including the introduction of a new electricity 
tax. In addition, the petroleum tax has been redesigned to provide more incentives for investment 
in energy-saving vehicles.  
Further energy-related policy measures in Germany include the CO2 Building 
Rehabilitation Programme which provided incentives for energy-efficient building refurbishment 
(Rosenow 2013). The programme is regarded as highly effective, having incentivized innovation 
both for building technology producers and house owners, including firms (Schroeder et al. 2011, 
Kuckshinrichs et al. 2010, Kronenberg et al. 2012, Galvin 2012). The German Federal 
Government is also running several R&D programs that foster the development of energy-saving 
technologies, The Federal Government’s 6th Energy Research Programme (2011-2016) focuses 
on energy saving and energy efficiency, wind energy, photovoltaic, solar technology, bio-energy, 
and nuclear fusion. The annual volume of R&D funding through this program targeting both 
firms and public research organisations amounts to more than 0.8 billion € (BMWi 2016). There 
are no large-scale voluntary agreements on energy saving or energy efficiency on a cross-
industry level in Germany, though individual industries such as the chemical industry or the 
automotive have been following such an approach. 
In Austria, energy always ranked high on the policy agenda. Energy intensive sectors have 
a high share in manufacturing output and mainly serve international markets, hence energy costs 
have always been a key issue for these industries. While domestic renewable energy from 
hydraulic power offers a cheap energy source and provides a comparative advantage to energy 
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intensive production, increasing energy efficiency has become a main focus of energy policy 
(Köppl and Schratzenstaller 2015). The Energy Efficiency Law is the main regulatory approach 
in this respect. It came into force at the beginning of 2015, adopting EU guidelines that demand 
energy efficiency gains of 20 percent until 2020 (relative to 2005). It aims for a combination of 
regulatory rigor and dynamic incentives through a combination of bureaucratic control and 
(indirect) market mechanisms. At its core, energy suppliers (except small ones) must prove 
concrete measures to achieve annual efficiency gains of 0.6 percent relative to their previous 
year’s total energy sales. These efficiency gains may originate either from their own operations 
or from its customers and depend on the ratio of energy inputs to output (i.e., not on total energy 
use). Missing the target triggers a compensatory penalty, which is paid to a fund that promotes 
energy saving activities. While energy using firms are not directly charged for missing the target, 
they are allowed to sell their efficiency measures to their energy supplier. There is no regulatory 
protection against suppliers discriminating prices to the disadvantage of firms that cannot offer 
such savings. The law commands large companies either to install a proper energy management 
system, or to have an energy audit every four years. In addition to the Energy Efficiency Law, 
the Austrian tax authorities collect taxes and levies on the use of electricity, fossil fuels 
(petroleum, natural and liquid gas) and coal, which are generally based on physical units and not 
market prices. Tax rates differ by the type of energy source. There is a ceiling for energy-
intensive firms in manufacturing production (Kletzan-Slamanig and Köppl 2016), which was 
raised in 2004 from 0.3% to a maximum of 0.5% of value added.  
The Austrian Government offers public subsidies for developing and adopting green 
energy technologies. The Austrian Research Promotion Agency (FFG), which is the national 
funding agency for industrial research and development, runs a program for “energy research” 
since 2008, providing grants for R&D projects. The adoption of energy-saving technologies is 
supported through the Environmental Promotion scheme which offers low-interest loans. Both 
Austria and Germany participate in the EU CO2 emission trading scheme, which has been 
considerably reshaped for the period 2013 to 2020. While in general, the free allocation of 
emission permits will continuously decrease and be replaced by competitive auctions, sectors that 
are particularly exposed to "carbon leakage" remain exempted and will benefit from the 
undiminished free allocation of emission rights.  
In contrast to Germany and Austria, Switzerland has rather few policy measures to promote 
the development and adoption of energy-related technologies. The Swiss framework is 
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characterized by market incentives and voluntary agreements while there are only a few 
important targeted policies (see Stucki and Woerter 2016, Pellegrin and Woerter 2016). During 
the reference period of our study (2012-2014), a CO2-tax (levy; since 2008) was in place that 
was part of the first commitment period of the Kyoto protocol and a Swiss emission trading 
system (for heavy polluters)—which is still very narrow—started in 2013. There is also an 
emission regulation for passenger cars—similar to the EU-regulations—which has been effective 
since 2012. A feed-in-tariff system has been already introduced in 1998 and a (subsidy) program 
for adoption of green technologies in the building sector, started in 2010. There are also 
regulations concerning labelling, promotion and installation of renewable energy plants. Public 
subsidies are available in form of a technology fund to promote innovative technologies that 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions and the consumption of resources. It also supports the use of 
renewable energy and an increase in energy efficiency. There are also subsidies for basic 
research and applied R&D in form of pilot plants for economical and efficient use of energy and 
use of renewable energies.  
Table 1: Relevance of energy policy for firms in Germany, Switzerland and Austria 
Share in all  Germany Switzerland Austria Total 
firms in % somewhat 
relevant 
highly 
relevant 
somewhat 
relevant
highly 
relevant
somewhat 
relevant
highly 
relevant 
somewhat 
relevant 
highly 
relevant
Energy taxes1) 34.3 18.5 30.8 10.9 27.2 15.7 32.7 17.1
Energy-related 
regulation1) 22.8 8.3 24.5 9.0 23.7 1.5 23.2 7.3
Energy-related 
standards/voluntary 
agreements1) 
16.7 6.2 21.3 6.3 20.4 3.5 17.8 5.8
Subsidies for 
energy 
technologies1) 
21.1 10.0 19.8 7.2 22.6 6.2 21.2 9.0
Demand for energy-
efficient products 18.7 6.6 20.0 6.0 20.9 5.0 19.2 6.3
1) with respect to the domestic energy policies.  
Source: KOF/WIFO/ZEW: Energy technology survey 2015, weighted results. 
Despite the quite different energy policy environments in Germany, Switzerland and 
Austria, firms from the three countries perceive the energy policy environment in their country 
rather similar. German firms more often report energy taxes to be highly relevant for their 
business (19%) while only 11% of Swiss firms consider energy taxes highly relevant (see Table 
1). Energy regulations are most often quoted as relevant by Swiss firms, while firms from 
Germany and Austria show higher shares when it comes to subsidies for energy technologies, 
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reflecting the widespread support activities of both governments in this area. For the demand for 
green energy, which is not a direct characteristic of energy policy but can be strongly affected by 
energy policy, we find very similar shares of firms quoting demand for green energy as being 
relevant for the business for each country. As demand includes customers from abroad, which are 
subject to energy policies of other government, the similar results may reflect similar export 
markets of the three economies. 
4 Data and Empirical Strategy 
We use data from a firm survey that was conducted in each of the three countries studied in 
this paper during 2015 based on a uniform questionnaire and common survey methodology. The 
survey covered both manufacturing and services. It collected information on energy 
consumption, the role of energy policy for a firm’s operation, and the development and adoption 
of energy-related technologies as well as information on various firm characteristics (including 
exports) and the firms’ market environment. In Switzerland and Austria, the survey was 
conducted as a stand-alone survey by the Swiss Economic Institute (KOF) and the Austrian 
Institute of Economic Research (WIFO) while in Germany it was part of the annual innovation 
survey (the German contribution to the Community Innovation Survey of the EU) conducted by 
the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW). Details on the survey and its methodology 
can be found in Arvanitis et al. (2016a). The net sample of the survey includes 4,634 
observations, 49% of them are German firms, 39% Swiss firms and 12% Austrian firms. On 
average, the firms in our sample have 269 employees (median: 38 employees). 50.4% of the 
firms belong to the manufacturing sector (including energy and water supply and waste 
management activities) and 49.6% to services (including construction services).  
The information on firms’ activities related to green energy technologies refers both to the 
introduction of any new energy-related technologies during 2012 and 2014 for in-house use 
(“adoption”), and to the development of such technologies for selling the technology on the 
market during the same period (“development”). Five areas of energy technologies are 
distinguished: (1) production technologies, (2) information and communication technologies, (3) 
transport and logistics technologies, (4) building and heating technologies, and (5) green energy-
generating technologies from renewable sources. As the area of energy technology activity is 
strongly driven by a firm’s industry and market (e.g. manufacturing firms typically focus on 
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production technologies, firms in trade and transport on logistics technologies, and service firms 
on building and heating technologies, and energy technology development mainly takes place in 
firms specialised in the respective field of technology), we do not separate between the five areas 
but consider any firm as adopter or developer if in at least one area a new energy technology has 
been introduced or developed. 
The identification of the relevance of different energy policies at the firm level is hardly 
possible through ‘objective’ data that can be observed from public sources. We hence rely on 
survey and ask managers to rate the relevance of different energy policies for their firm’s 
business on a three-point Likert scale (see Johnstone et al. 2012, Lanoie et al. 2011, Stucki and 
Woerter 2016, Veugelers 2012 for similar procedures). While subjectivity of survey data may 
limit comparability across firms (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2009), there are two advantages for 
our research design. First, we are able cover all types of policies on the same measurement level. 
This would be hardly possible if external data for different policy areas such as tax rates, 
emission trading certificates, participation in voluntary agreements or receipt of government 
subsidies would be employed. Second, we can establish the relevance of energy policies also for 
firms that might not be directly targeted by a certain policy. This overcomes the frequent 
difficulty that arises from the fact that different policies typically target different firms, that 
policies may exist at multiple levels (e.g. federal and local), and that monitoring and enforcement 
are imperfect (Millimet and Roy 2015, Levinson 2008, Shadbegian and Wolverton 2010, Xing 
and Kolstad 2002).  
In order to establish whether the adoption of energy technologies has been related to energy 
policy (in order to test H2), we refrained from putting forward a direct question on that link (e.g. 
as done in the 2008 Community Innovation Survey, see Horbach et al. 2012, Rexhäuser and 
Rammer 2014) but rather asked managers whether increasing energy efficiency has been a key 
motive for adopting new energy technologies, or whether it was a side effect. If firms had 
introduced new energy technologies in order to increase energy efficiency and had at the same 
time reported earlier in the questionnaire that certain energy policies were relevant for their 
business operations, we would regard energy technology adoption in these firms as—directly or 
indirectly—related to these energy policies. For testing H3, we can utilise information on 
whether energy technology adoption led to an increase in energy-efficiency (and hence lowered 
unit cost of production) by directly asking all firms that introduced new energy technologies 
during 2012 and 2014 whether this technology adoption led to a decrease in energy consumption 
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per unit of output by the end of 2014. If adoption has led to an increase in efficiency, we would 
expect a positive effect on export performance. 
Combining motives for and cost impacts of energy technology adoption with the relevance 
of energy policies and considering our three hypotheses developed in section 2 gives a matrix of 
expected impacts of energy policy relevance and adoption of energy technologies on export 
performance (see Table 2). Assuming that energy taxes and energy-related regulation will 
increase firms’ unit costs, we will expect negative impacts of firms subject to these policies, 
except policy-related technology adoption led to energy cost reduction. If technology adoption 
was not related to energy policy and increased energy efficiency, the expected impact is less 
clear since the side effect of energy efficiency increase may not have been related to costs that a 
firm has to bear in order to comply with energy policy. For energy-related standards and 
voluntary agreements, we do not have clear expectations as the impact of these policy measures 
on cost is unclear. For subsidies for energy technologies and demand for green energy, we would 
expect positive impacts on export performance for adopters when the key motive of adoption was 
increasing energy efficiency as these firms will have profited either directly (by receiving 
subsidies for their technology adoption) or indirectly (by a lower price of new energy technology 
resulting from subsidies for others). For the other group of adopters, the positive impact is less 
obvious if adoption was not related to a subsidies technology.  
Table 2: Expected impacts of energy policy relevance and adoption of energy technologies on 
export performance 
  Adoption of energy technologies 
  yes no 
  Key motive: increasing energy efficiency  
  yes no  
  Cost reduction achieved Cost reduction achieved  
Relevance of energy policies  yes no yes no  
yes  0 [14.4]  - [5.4]  -/0 [7.5]  - [5.9]  - [26.3]Energy taxes /  
energy-related regulation no  + [3.8]  0 [2.2]  +/0 [3.9]  0 [4.6]  0 [26.0]
yes  0/+ [9.3]  -/0 [3.0]  0 [3.9]  -/0 [2.9]  -/0[11.5]Energy-related standards / 
voluntary agreements no  + [8.9]  +/0 [4.6]  +/0 [7.4]  0 [7.6]  0 [40.8]
yes  + [12.1]  + [5.1]  +/0 [5.4]  +/0 [4.6]  0 [15.8]Subsidies for energy technologies / 
demand for green energy no  + [6.1]  +/0 [2.5]  +/0 [6.0]  0 [5.9]  0 [36.6]
+/0/-: expected positive/neutral/negative impact on export performance.  
Figures in brackets give the percentage of firms (in the net sample of surveyed firms) that fall under the respective 
category; percentages add up to 100 for each of the three areas of energy policies. 
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When counting the number of firms in our sample showing a combination of energy policy 
relevance2 and energy technology adoption motives and effects, for which we would expect a 
clearly positive export performance impact (‘+’ in Table 2), 23.3% of all firms fall in this group.3 
At the same time, for 37.6% of firms we would expect clearly negative expected impacts (‘-’ in 
Table 2). Note that one and the same firm may fall into both groups (which is actually the case 
for 4.1% of all firms). For 30.4% of firms we would expect rather positive export impacts (‘+/0’) 
and for 24.9% rather negative ones (‘0/-’). 81.4% of all firms report relevance of energy policies 
and energy technology adoption patterns that have been classified as neutral (‘0’).  
Export performance of firms is measured by the share of exports in total sales at the end of 
the three year reference period (i.e. 2014), which is applied to the questions related to the 
relevance of energy policies and the development and adoption of energy technologies. We use 
the export share in 2012 to control for a firm’s initial export performance. This allows us to 
analyse a likely impact of energy policies and energy technology adoption on changes in export 
performance rather than on the level of export activities. 
We employ two complementary methods for investigating likely impacts of energy policy 
relevance and energy technology adoption on export performance. First, we use standard 
regression modelling in order to determine whether energy policies and energy technology 
adoption affect export performance. To test our hypotheses, we combine a firm’s assessment of 
energy policy relevance for five policy areas (taxation, regulation, standards/voluntary 
agreements, subsidies, demand) with the five energy technology adoption patterns shown in 
Table 2. This allows us to test our hypotheses across the three countries of our study by looking 
at cross-country differences in policy relevance, adoption patterns and export performance. 
A regression approach is less suited for looking at country-specific policy effects since 
splitting models by countries would result in a low number of observations per model 
                                                 
2 A policy area is considered as relevant if a firm stated that the policy was ‘somewhat’ or ‘highly’ relevant for the 
firm’s business. We follow this measurement for policy relevance in the remainder of the paper. Considering only 
firms stating that a certain policy was ‘highly’ relevant (i.e. ignoring firms with ‘somewhat relevant’) produces 
qualitatively very similar results. In the regression analysis, we will present robustness checks for an alternative 
measurement of policy relevance that relies on ‘highly relevant’ only. 
3 Note that the percentages reported here cannot be calculated by summing up the percentages shown in Table 2 as 
firms may show the same expected effect for two or even three energy policy areas. 
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(particularly in the case of Austria). Alternatively, one could interact policy and adoption 
variables with country dummies. This would result in a huge number of interaction effects and 
potential multicollinearity problems. We hence employ a more flexible semi-parametric 
matching method which basically combines propensity score stratification with a weighting 
scheme. The next section presents the results of the regression analysis, followed by the results of 
the matching approach. 
5 Regression Estimation Results on Policy Impacts 
The export performance model uses export share in t as main dependent variable. As this 
variable is zero for all firms without any export activity (which is roughly half of our sample as 
the sample includes a large number of service firms and small firms), we use tobit models to 
consider this pile-up of zeros. In addition, we also run models using an export dummy (export 
activity in t vs. no exports in t) and the export share in t only for firms with positive exports. This 
informs whether policy and adoption rather affect a firm’s ability to enter into export activity, or 
whether they change the export intensity of already exporting firms. In all models, we control for 
initial export performance in t-2. For robustness checks, we also consider the change in the 
export share between t-2 and t, and the change in export volume between t-2 and t. In order to 
identify likely policy and adoption effects, we need to control for other determinants of export 
performance, including price competitiveness, product differentiation, and a firm’s resources (see 
Arnold and Hussinger 2010, Beise-Zee and Rammer 2006, Cassiman et al. 2010). Our control 
variables include product and process innovations outside of energy technologies for capturing 
product differentiation, size, age, and membership of a domestic or foreign company group for 
capturing firm resources relevant for exporting, and unit labour costs, the share of material input 
and relative labour productivity as measures of price competitiveness. In addition, we add 
energy-specific variables which may affect export performance and correlate with energy policy 
relevance and energy technology activities. Energy intensity in t-2 is used to control for a firm’s 
general incentives to engage in measures to increase energy efficiency. The energy sources used 
by a firm are intended to capture different price developments for energy sources which may also 
affect the relevance of certain policies and the incentives for adopting new technologies. All 
models also include country and industry dummies.  
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Our key variables for testing the hypotheses are energy policy relevance and the pattern of 
energy technology adoption with respect to whether increasing energy efficiency was a key 
motive, and whether the adoption actually led to an increase in energy efficiency. In addition, we 
consider, whether a firm has developed new energy technologies for the market (i.e. as a product 
innovation). Descriptive statistics for all model variables can be found in Table 6 in the 
Appendix. We estimate two model variants. First, we include the policy and adoption variables 
separately. Second, we combine the two groups of variables to investigate whether adoption and 
policy relevance coincides, potentially balancing likely positive and negative effects. As we have 
five policy areas and five adoption patterns (including no adoption), we end up with 25 combined 
policy-adoption variables. 
The results of the first model variant are shown in Table 3 for the main model and in Table 
7 and Table 8 in the Appendix for alternative model specifications. In the base model (see 
column 1 in Table 3), we find a statistically significant positive relationship between energy 
technology adoption and export performance along with a significant positive effect for firms 
that have developed new energy technologies for the market. We do not find any strong 
significant impact for any of the five policy variables. For one policy variable—demand for 
energy efficient products—a statistically negative effect appears, though at the 10% level of 
significance only. This may suggest that a policy that increased demand for energy-efficient 
products redirects firms to domestic markets.4 When replacing the adoption variable by two 
variables measuring the key motive (increasing energy efficiency or any other motive) and 
adding a variable whether an increase in efficiency has been achieved (column 2), it turns out 
that an achieved increase in energy efficiency has no impact on export performance. When 
combining motives and achieved efficiency impacts of energy technology adoption into four 
variables (using non-adopters as a reference, see column 3), we find that technology adopters that 
aimed at increasing energy efficiency and having met this goals perform better, but also adopters 
that did not aim at increasing energy efficiency through introducing green energy technologies 
and also did not experience any efficiency increase. For the latter group, one may assume that the 
adoption of green energy technologies was part of other process innovations aiming at increasing 
                                                 
4 Note that firms were asked to assess the relevance of demand for energy-efficient products for domestic and 
foreign markets. We merged this information into one demand variable in order to avoid endogeneity as only 
exporting firms are able to provide information about foreign demand. 
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productivity or improving the quality of processes, which had positive impacts on their export 
performance. 
Table 3: Impact of energy policy relevance and energy technology adoption on export 
performance of firms: estimation results of tobit models 
Dep. var.: export share in t (1) (2) (3) 
(percentage) coeff. std.err. coeff. std.err. coeff. std.err. 
Energy policy relevance          
Taxation 1.286 (1.028)  1.294 (1.029)  1.343 (1.029)  
Regulation 1.667 (1.168)  1.686 (1.169)  1.685 (1.168)  
Standards/voluntary agreements -1.237 (1.174)  -1.224 (1.175)  -1.334 (1.175)  
Subsidies -0.611 (1.092)  -0.652 (1.100)  -0.578 (1.099)  
Demand -1.898 (1.130) * -1.905 (1.130) * -1.917 (1.130) * 
Energy technology adoption          
Adoption of energy technology 2.312 (1.068) **       
Key motive: efficiency gains     2.965 (1.554) *    
Key motive: others     2.643 (1.416) *    
Adoption lead to higher efficiency    -0.804 (1.329)     
Efficiency: motive & achieved1)       3.002 (1.371) ** 
Efficiency: motive, not achieved1)       0.711 (1.842)  
Efficiency: no motive & achieved1)       0.436 (1.514)  
Efficiency: no motive, not achieved1)       4.238 (1.571) *** 
Energy technology development 3.754 (1.793) ** 3.778 (1.795) ** 3.822 (1.794) ** 
Control variables          
Export share in t-22) 0.977 (0.018) *** 0.977 (0.018) *** 0.978 (0.018) *** 
Energy intensity in t-22) -0.058 (0.068)  -0.060 (0.068)  -0.060 (0.068)  
Energy source: own renewables -3.627 (2.560)  -3.617 (2.564)  -3.753 (2.564)  
Energy source: oil -1.899 (1.907)  -1.914 (1.907)  -1.872 (1.905)  
Energy source: natural gas -3.822 (1.819) ** -3.803 (1.819) ** -3.763 (1.819) ** 
Other product innovation 7.081 (1.012) *** 7.095 (1.013) *** 7.134 (1.012) *** 
Other process innovation 0.434 (1.403)  0.424 (1.404)  0.381 (1.403)  
Size 0.125 (0.476)  0.129 (0.476)  0.127 (0.476)  
Age  1.663 (0.339) *** 1.667 (0.340) *** 1.689 (0.339) *** 
Foreign group 10.252 (1.474) *** 10.230 (1.475) *** 10.189 (1.473) *** 
Domestic group 2.293 (1.142) ** 2.277 (1.143) ** 2.226 (1.142) * 
Unit labour cost2) 0.360 (1.025)  0.361 (1.026)  0.313 (1.028)  
Material share2) 9.177 (2.554) *** 9.139 (2.554) *** 9.219 (2.552) *** 
Relative labour productivity t-22) 0.550 (0.246) ** 0.552 (0.246) ** 0.559 (0.246) ** 
Austria 6.924 (1.641) *** 6.975 (1.647) *** 7.021 (1.646) *** 
Switzerland 3.550 (1.456) ** 3.584 (1.457) ** 3.784 (1.458) *** 
Constant -32.59 (4.071) *** -32.63 (4.074) *** -32.99 (4.077) *** 
No. of observations 4,090 4,090 4,090 
No. of censored observations 2,033 2,033 2,033 
Log likelihood 4,321.9 4,322.3 4,327.6 
***, **, *: significant at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 level. 
Each model includes 25 industry dummies which are jointly significant. 
1) Reference category: no adoption 
2) Missing values are set to 0 and dummy variables indicating missing observations have been included. 
Most of our control variables are statistically significant and show the expected signs. 
Naturally, past export performance is a main predictor for current export performance. Product 
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differentiation through product innovation has a strongly positive export effect which confirms 
the results of many prior studies (see Becker and Egger 2013, Bleaney und Wakelin 2002, 
Wakelin 1998, Lachenmaier und Wößmann 2006, Roper and Love 2002). We do not find size 
effects (as the impact of size of the level of export performance is mirrored in initial export 
performance), while we do find positive effects for age and group membership. Unit labour cost 
does not affect export performance significantly, reflecting that the competitive advantage of 
firms from Germany, Switzerland and Austria on export markets seems to be related to quality 
features of their products rather than cost advantages. Firms with a high share of inputs in total 
sales and firms with a high productivity compared to their industry average show better export 
performance. We also find highly significant positive coefficients for firms from Austria and 
Switzerland (with Germany as reference), indicating that firms from smaller economies tend to 
show a higher and more rapidly increasing export share. Energy intensity shows no significant 
impact on export performance while firms using natural gas as an energy source show a worse 
export performance which may be related to a less favourable price development of this energy 
source in the period considered in this study (2012 to 2014). 
The findings do not differ substantially if other model specifications are considered. When 
The results of probit regressions on the probability to export (Table 7) and OLS regressions on 
the export share of exporting firms (Table 8) suggest that the positive effect of energy technology 
adoption relates to a positive impact on the propensity to export, but not on the export share of 
exporting firms. The OLS regression results report a significant positive effect for energy-related 
regulations: firms stating that such regulations are relevant for their business show a higher 
export share. The results of the probit model on the probability to export (Table 7) demonstrate a 
statistically significant negative impact of demand for energy-efficient products. A significant 
negative impact of demand is also found for the model specification using the change in the 
export volume as export performance variable (see Table 9). All other policy variables are 
insignificant in that model, as are the adoption variables. For the model specification with the 
change in export share between 2012 and 2014 as dependent variable we do not find any 
significant effects, neither for policy nor for adoption variables.  
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Table 4: Impact of combinations of energy policy relevance and energy technology adoption 
patterns on export performance of firms: estimation results of tobit models 
Dep. var.: export share in t (percentage) coeff. std.err. 
Energy policy relevance & energy technology adoption motives and impacts    
Taxation & adoption (motive energy efficiency & increase in efficiency) 0.795 (2.024)  
Regulation & adoption (motive energy efficiency & increase in efficiency) 3.890 (2.298) * 
Standards/vol. agr. & adoption (motive energy efficiency & increase in efficiency) 0.404 (2.227)  
Subsidies & adoption (motive energy efficiency & increase in efficiency) -0.287 (2.077)  
Demand & adoption (motive energy efficiency & increase in efficiency) -2.589 (2.167)  
Taxation & adoption (motive energy efficiency & no increase in efficiency) 1.061 (3.299)  
Regulation & adoption (motive energy efficiency & no increase in efficiency) -1.534 (4.126)  
Standards/vol. agr. & adoption (motive energy efficiency & no increase in efficiency) 2.433 (3.770)  
Subsidies & adoption (motive energy efficiency & no increase in efficiency) 0.696 (3.242)  
Demand & adoption (motive energy efficiency & no increase in efficiency) -4.391 (3.742)  
Taxation & adoption (other motive & increase in efficiency) 2.963 (2.500)  
Regulation & adoption (other motive & increase in efficiency) -2.247 (3.212)  
Standards/vol. agr. & adoption (other motive & increase in efficiency) -1.411 (3.091)  
Subsidies & adoption (other motive & increase in efficiency) 2.388 (3.026)  
Demand & adoption (other motive & increase in efficiency) -4.207 (2.868)  
Taxation & adoption (other motive & no increase in efficiency) 1.683 (2.759)  
Regulation & adoption (motive energy efficiency, no increase in efficiency) 6.099 (3.604) * 
Standards/vol. agr. & adoption (other motive & no increase in efficiency) -1.823 (3.559)  
Subsidies & adoption (other motive & no increase in efficiency) -1.893 (3.131)  
Demand & adoption (other motive & no increase in efficiency) 2.217 (3.105)  
Taxation & no adoption  1.381 (1.356)  
Regulation & no adoption  1.554 (1.750)  
Standards/vol. agr. & no adoption  -3.169 (1.926)  
Subsidies & no adoption  -0.864 (1.778)  
Demand & no adoption -1.078 (1.778)  
Energy technology development 4.203 (1.791) ** 
Control variables    
Export share in t-21) 0.979 (0.018) *** 
Energy intensity in t-21) -0.050 (0.068)  
Energy source: own renewables -3.670 (2.566)  
Energy source: oil -1.854 (1.909)  
Energy source: natural gas -3.854 (1.819) ** 
Other product innovation 7.218 (1.010) *** 
Other process innovation -0.163 (1.351)  
Size 0.125 (0.476)  
Age  1.726 (0.338) *** 
Foreign group 10.044 (1.475) *** 
Domestic group 2.169 (1.143) * 
Unit labour cost1) 0.256 (1.027)  
Material share1) 9.227 (2.557) *** 
Relative labour productivity t-21) 0.565 (0.246) ** 
Austria 7.271 (1.654) *** 
Switzerland 3.594 (1.454) ** 
Constant -31.98 (4.084) *** 
No. of observations 4,090 
No. of censored observations 2,033 
Log likelihood 4,335.2 
***, **, *: significant at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 level. 
Each model includes 25 industry dummies which are jointly significant. 
1) Missing values are set to 0 and dummy variables indicating missing observations have been included. 
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The result of our second model variant with combined policy-adoption variables produces 
insignificant coefficients for almost all combinations (see Table 4).5 There are only two 
exceptions. Firms reporting energy-related regulation as relevant and who have either introduced 
new energy technologies for increasing energy efficiency (and having met this goal) or who have 
adopted energy technologies for other purposes (and did not experience any efficiency increase), 
export performance is significantly higher, though only at a 10% level of significance. The first 
result suggests that there might be a slight positive impact of energy-related regulation on 
competitiveness as proposed by the Porter hypotheses: If regulation initiates effective technology 
adoption, the efficiency gains from new technology seems to exceed the costs of complying with 
the regulation.  
The results of the main model have to be qualified when looking at alternative model 
specifications (Table 10 in the Appendix). The probit model on export probability shows a 
weakly significant impact of subsidies if combined with technology adoption that successfully 
aims at energy efficiency, and a positive effect of energy taxation if combined with technology 
adoption that increases energy efficiency as a side goal of adoption. For this type of adopters, a 
weakly significant negative effect occurs, if energy-related regulation is relevant for them. For 
firms that did not adopt energy technologies and are subject to energy-related regulation, we find 
a significant positive export performance effect, while a negative one is found if subsidies for 
energy technologies are relevant for them. The latter may indicate a competitive disadvantage, if 
their competitors used the subsidies to update their technological base. The model variants using 
the change in export share and the change in export volumes as dependent variables mainly 
produce insignificant results for the combined policy-adoption variables. We find a significant 
negative coefficient if demand for energy-efficient products is relevant and the firm successfully 
adopted energy-efficient technologies, suggesting that a policy shaping demand towards higher 
energy efficiency may motivate technology adopters to serve the domestic demand and reduce 
exports. Or to put it differently: domestic demand is more responsive to energy efficiently 
produced products compared to foreign markets if the regulation in foreign markets is less 
stringent and hence there is no willingness to pay for environmentally friendly produced 
                                                 
5 This result also holds if policy relevance is measured in a more narrow way by only considering firms as affected 
by a policy if managers stated that the respective energy policy has been ‘highly’ significant for their business. 
Estimation results based on this alternative definition are shown in Table 12 in the Appendix. 
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products. In addition, we find a positive impact of subsidies on export performance for 
technology adopters that did neither aim at nor achieve to increasing energy efficiency. 
The results of regressions analyses suggest that energy policy, as perceived by firms, has 
little impacts on export performance. Firms that report high relevance of energy taxes and 
energy-related regulation—which both are often viewed as cost burdens for firms and potentially 
impeding their international competitiveness—do not show lower export performance. For 
regulation, we even find some positive impacts if firms adopt new energy technologies at the 
same time. All in all, we cannot confirm hypotheses 1 and 2 but find some evidence for our third 
hypothesis, i.e. that higher costs of energy policy measures are balanced by more energy efficient 
production. In general, energy policies in the three countries considered did not have a major 
impact on international competitiveness during the period considered in this study. This finding 
refers to the average effect across all three countries, however. The next section tries to identify 
likely country-specific differences in the link between energy policy, energy technology adoption 
and export performance. 
6 Results of a Matching Approach on Country-specific 
Policy Impacts 
We employ a matching approach for investigating country-specific policy impacts. The 
basic idea is to compare the export performance of firms from three countries Germany, 
Switzerland and Austria that operate under a very similar situation (in terms of their resources, 
their capabilities to successfully export, their energy intensity and energy sources they use, and 
their past export performance) and that experience the same relevance of energy policies and 
show the same pattern of energy technology adoption (in terms of energy efficiency as key 
motive and as a result of technology adoption).  
As usual in matching approaches, we estimate a propensity score model and take its results 
for matching, using the marginal mean weighting through stratification (MMWS). MMWS is a 
nonparametric adjustment technique that combines propensity score stratification with a 
weighting scheme (Hong 2010). The treatment variables in the propensity score matching are the 
combinations of energy policy relevance and energy technology adoption. Due to limitations in 
the number of observations, we cannot consider all 25 combinations but consider the 
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combinations between policy and adoption motive on the one hand, and policy and energy 
efficiency results of adoption on the other. The probit models for calculation propensity scores 
basically include the same set of variables as used in the export performance models, along with 
a few more variables to control for as many elements of firm heterogeneity as possible. This 
additional variables include a dummy for in-house R&D activity, measures for the competitive 
environment of the firm (number of main competitors and an indicator on the intensity of 
competition), capital expenditure in t-2, whether a change in the composition of energy sources 
between t-2 and t resulted in a positive or negative change in energy costs per unit of output, the 
share of graduated employees, and whether energy shortages or fluctuations in energy prices had 
affected the firm’s operation between t-2 and t. 
Basis for the MMWS matching procedure are the propensity scores for each study group. 
The ‘treatment’ group includes all firms with a certain combination of energy technology 
adoption and relevance of a certain energy policy area while the control group consists of firms 
for which this combination does not apply. The propensity scores are derived from bivariate 
logistic regressions for each policy-adoption combination which are estimated for each of the 
three countries separately. Propensity scores reduce the different observation unit’s set of 
covariates to a single score. The entire range of propensity scores is then divided into five 
different strata which are the quantiles of the distribution. To create comparability between the 
treatment and the control group, MMWS assigns weights to the units in the treatment group and 
the control group within each stratum such that the weighted groups depicts similar distributions 
of the covariates used for the propensity score estimation. The weights are marginal mean 
weights for each stratum and are computed as follows:  
(ns / nsz) x P r(Z = z) = (ns / nsz) x (nz / n) 
The ratio ns / nsz is the inverse of the probability to be assigned to observations in stratum s 
in study group z, where ns denotes the number of observations in stratum s and nsz the number of 
observations in stratum s of study group z. P r(Z = z) = nz / n is the probability of belonging to 
study group z, i.e. the share of numbers of observations in study group z (nz) on total (n). The 
number ns x P r(Z = z) is therefore the expected number of units in stratum s in a completely 
randomized experiment where the weights would all be equal to 1. In a randomised experiment 
the assignment to the treatment groups and the control group would be completely random and 
the distributions of all sample characteristics are equal in each study group. Hence the weighting 
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scheme adjusts the observed sample to an optimal sampling design for computing treatment 
effects. The average treatment effects—here: firms’ export activities and outcomes—can now be 
easily estimated by calculating the difference between the weighted mean outcomes of the treated 
and the control units, respectively. 
The matching results show very few statistically significant country differences in the 
impacts of energy policy relevance and energy technology adoption on firms’ export 
performance. Table 5 presents the results for the five areas of energy policy combined with the 
adoption of new energy technologies. We find a few significant negative impacts on the export 
intensity of export-active Swiss firms that introduced new energy technologies, when not being 
affected by potentially cost raising energy policies (taxation, regulation). This result suggests that 
the adoption of green energy technologies that is not related to policy pressure may result in too 
low efficiency gains compared to firms in Germany and Austria where technology adopters—
even if not driven by policies—may profit from a higher level of efficiency improvements related 
to available new energy technologies. We also find weakly significant negative effect on the 
export propensity of German firms if they refrained from technology adoption and are not 
concerned by certain energy policies (taxation, standards/voluntary agreements, subsidies). For 
Swiss firms, a positive effect of demand for energy-efficient products on the export share of 
exporting firms shows up in case the firms did not adopt new energy technologies. For firms 
quoting energy policies as relevant for their business, we do not find any negative result except 
for Austrian and German firms stating that demand for energy-efficient products is relevant. 
The overwhelmingly insignificant results remain when the relevance of energy policies is 
combined with the key motive of technology adoption (Table 13 in the Appendix) and with the 
efficiency increase resulting from technology adoption (Table 14 in the Appendix). The only 
negative policy impacts found in these analyses are for energy-related regulations in Austria in 
case firms did not adopt new energy technologies aiming at increasing efficiency, and for the 
demand variable in Austria if combined with technology adoption aiming at efficiency increase. 
While the former may hint to some cost burden of energy regulation if facilities are not upgraded, 
the latter can again show the market reorientation of firms if domestic demand for energy-
efficient products is high, as already discussed above. 
One should critically note that the empirical results of our matching analysis are limited by 
the sometimes small number of observations for each combination, particularly in the case of 
Austria where for some policy-adoption combinations only 20 to 30 observations are available. 
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For Germany and Switzerland, the number of observations per combination is usually close to or 
above 100, providing more robust results. 
Table 5: Matching results on export performance by combinations of energy policy relevance and 
energy technology adoption, by country 
Export activity in t Export share in t  
(all firms) 
Export share in t 
(exporters only) 
Change in export 
share betw. t-2 and t 
Country Energy 
policy 
Techno-
logy 
adoption Effect sign. Effect sign. Effect sign. Effect sign. 
Energy taxes      
GER yes yes 0.8% 0.816 -0.3% 0.813 -1.0% 0.699 0.1% 0.820 
SUI yes yes -0.4% 0.939 -0.7% 0.802 -1.7% 0.660 0.7% 0.473 
AUT yes yes 4.0% 0.393 4.7% 0.519 3.2% 0.685 -0.5% 0.649 
GER yes no -0.7% 0.838 -1.2% 0.415 -2.6% 0.291 0.0% 0.991 
SUI yes no 3.6% 0.320 2.1% 0.445 0.9% 0.828 -0.3% 0.908 
AUT yes no -3.1% 0.596 1.5% 0.797 3.7% 0.570 2.3% 0.022** 
GER no yes -0.7% 0.830 -1.2% 0.453 -2.0% 0.444 0.2% 0.785 
SUI no yes 3.6% 0.465 -4.7% 0.097* -11.4% 0.016** 1.0% 0.478 
AUT no yes 7.3% 0.140 -6.0% 0.276 -10.8% 0.093 -0.4% 0.698 
GER no no -7.0% 0.098* -1.7% 0.272 0.5% 0.882 -1.1% 0.049** 
SUI no no -5.7% 0.120 -0.9% 0.659 4.7% 0.180 -0.1% 0.944 
AUT no no 7.5% 0.344 -1.8% 0.843 -6.5% 0.518 -1.1% 0.300 
Energy-related regulation       
GER yes yes -7.4% 0.068 -0.7% 0.695 2.6% 0.345 0.8% 0.265 
SUI yes yes 4.6% 0.454 -0.8% 0.795 -6.2% 0.315 1.2% 0.350 
AUT yes yes 1.8% 0.896 14.2% 0.421 16.7% 0.279 -0.6% 0.436 
GER yes no -3.0% 0.525 -2.1% 0.298 -2.6% 0.477 -0.4% 0.454 
SUI yes no 3.5% 0.343 1.8% 0.509 0.4% 0.913 2.0% 0.362 
AUT yes no -4.9% 0.498 1.1% 0.862 4.5% 0.546 -0.1% 0.932 
GER no yes 5.5% 0.029** 0.1% 0.930 -2.7% 0.186 -0.2% 0.704 
SUI no yes 6.3% 0.148 -2.6% 0.331 -9.5% 0.022** -0.5% 0.389 
AUT no yes 1.7% 0.775 3.3% 0.565 3.2% 0.599 -0.8% 0.484 
GER no no -1.7% 0.560 -0.3% 0.862 0.5% 0.846 -0.1% 0.789 
SUI no no -1.6% 0.645 0.1% 0.950 2.3% 0.541 -0.9% 0.329 
AUT no no -1.9% 0.832 -4.4% 0.507 -4.6% 0.531 0.4% 0.768 
Energy-related standards/voluntary agreements     
GER yes yes 0.4% 0.921 1.4% 0.496 2.4% 0.441 -0.1% 0.826 
SUI yes yes 10.6% 0.178 -1.8% 0.681 -11.7% 0.249 0.5% 0.584 
AUT yes yes -8.9% 0.522 4.5% 0.652 11.9% 0.143 0.5% 0.740 
GER yes no 1.3% 0.792 -1.8% 0.441 -4.4% 0.271 -0.9% 0.108 
SUI yes no -0.9% 0.834 -0.3% 0.915 0.1% 0.974 -0.6% 0.684 
AUT yes no -0.5% 0.944 2.7% 0.701 3.9% 0.630 0.5% 0.519 
GER no yes 2.4% 0.332 0.0% 0.993 -1.3% 0.500 0.0% 0.983 
SUI no yes 5.3% 0.205 1.2% 0.703 -2.3% 0.574 -0.5% 0.567 
AUT no yes 6.0% 0.302 -2.0% 0.705 -5.9% 0.302 -1.3% 0.319 
GER no no -5.0% 0.084* -1.1% 0.381 0.4% 0.863 -0.7% 0.151 
SUI no no -0.9% 0.784 1.8% 0.405 4.7% 0.166 0.5% 0.667 
AUT no no -7.1% 0.382 -3.1% 0.634 0.2% 0.982 0.0% 0.967 
Subsidies for energy technologies        
GER yes yes 3.1% 0.441 2.4% 0.336 2.8% 0.430 0.2% 0.808 
SUI yes yes 0.2% 0.972 2.5% 0.586 3.3% 0.471 -0.6% 0.721 
AUT yes yes -15.2% 0.227 -2.3% 0.775 7.1% 0.284 -0.7% 0.364 
GER yes no -0.6% 0.902 -1.5% 0.521 -3.3% 0.385 -1.3% 0.026** 
SUI yes no -7.6% 0.078* -1.0% 0.748 5.9% 0.257 0.3% 0.890 
AUT yes no 2.2% 0.820 -6.3% 0.441 -9.0% 0.346 -0.3% 0.815 
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Export activity in t Export share in t  
(all firms) 
Export share in t 
(exporters only) 
Change in export 
share betw. t-2 and t 
Country Energy 
policy 
Techno-
logy 
adoption Effect sign. Effect sign. Effect sign. Effect sign. 
GER no yes 1.9% 0.446 0.4% 0.758 -0.3% 0.867 0.0% 0.921 
SUI no yes 4.7% 0.206 -0.2% 0.924 -4.0% 0.294 -0.6% 0.466 
AUT no yes 6.3% 0.421 -0.7% 0.905 -4.5% 0.432 -1.5% 0.422 
GER no no -5.8% 0.079* -1.8% 0.151 -0.8% 0.765 0.0% 0.918 
SUI no no 1.1% 0.736 -0.1% 0.951 -0.3% 0.939 -1.2% 0.299 
AUT no no -6.7% 0.331 -2.8% 0.610 0.2% 0.969 -0.8% 0.388 
Demand for energy-efficient products       
GER yes yes 1.6% 0.706 0.1% 0.960 -0.7% 0.815 0.4% 0.410 
SUI yes yes -0.9% 0.878 -1.6% 0.637 -2.6% 0.603 0.3% 0.709 
AUT yes yes -16.8% 0.188 1.1% 0.922 14.1% 0.130 -1.8% 0.003*** 
GER yes no 3.1% 0.556 -2.0% 0.327 -5.7% 0.109 -0.8% 0.073* 
SUI yes no -7.5% 0.129 2.4% 0.561 13.5% 0.010*** 3.8% 0.355 
AUT yes no 3.1% 0.703 -3.2% 0.687 -5.5% 0.558 0.6% 0.537 
GER no yes 2.2% 0.377 0.7% 0.575 0.0% 0.990 0.0% 0.967 
SUI no yes 6.7% 0.084* 1.0% 0.684 -4.3% 0.248 0.5% 0.640 
AUT no yes 8.2% 0.108 5.8% 0.288 2.2% 0.704 -0.5% 0.640 
GER no no -4.5% 0.105 -0.4% 0.761 1.5% 0.543 -0.2% 0.616 
SUI no no 1.6% 0.580 0.2% 0.905 -0.3% 0.926 0.1% 0.926 
AUT no no -4.6% 0.379 1.3% 0.855 4.2% 0.568 -0.9% 0.469 
***, **, *: significant at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 level. 
7 Conclusions 
In this study, we tried to analyse the impacts of energy policies on international 
competitiveness of firms while considering a likely moderating role of energy technology 
adoption. Our study is based on cross-section data for three European countries with somewhat 
different approaches to energy policy: Germany, Switzerland and Austria. Employing a 
harmonised firm-level data set of more than 4,000 firms and using regression and matching 
techniques, we find very few significant impacts of energy policy on firm international 
competitiveness (using various export indicators as measures for competitiveness). Our empirical 
findings suggest that energy policy in the three countries, at least in the period covered by our 
study—2012 to 2014—had no relevant influence on firms’ international market position. The 
only negative effect that appears at times stems from demand for energy-efficient products which 
seems to lead to some reorientation towards domestic markets. This result can also reflect a lack 
of regulatory framework abroad and hence a lower willingness to pay for environmentally 
friendlier produced products. For all other policy areas, including taxation, energy-related 
regulation and standards, and subsidies for energy technologies, we mostly find insignificant and 
rarely positively significant effects. Firms that introduced new energy technologies or that 
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developed such technologies for the market report better export performance, indicating that 
investment in ‘greener’ energy technologies pays off.  
These findings can be interpreted in different ways. If our empirical results are correct and 
robust, they imply that energy policy is not hurting international competitiveness. Likely 
negative impacts are either balanced by positive impacts of new technology adoption (see 
Arvanitis et al. 2016b) or the size of costs incurred by energy policy is too small to exert 
measurable effects. One has to keep in mind that the median of energy costs in total costs is 
about 1%, and that the additional costs from energy taxes and energy-related regulation is a small 
fraction of total energy costs for the vast majority of firms. It is hence not surprising to find 
insignificant impacts on competitiveness. In addition, the three economies analysed in this paper 
have strong comparative advantages in producing and trading knowledge-intensive goods. For 
these goods, price competition is less relevant than quality competition based on innovativeness 
and customer-specific solutions.  
Our results should be treated with caution, however, as they may be subject to several data 
limitations. First, our measure of energy policy is based on the assessment of firm managers 
rather than objective data (e.g. the actual amount of energy taxes paid). While the subjective 
measures enable a common scale for very different energy policy areas and also provide us with 
information on policy relevance for firms which may not be directly affected by certain policy 
measures, subjectivity may add substantial noise to our data. Furthermore, we only study energy 
policy impacts for a short period of time, 2012 to 2014. As energy policy in all three countries 
has been following a stable approach for more than a decade at least, it is likely that firms have 
adjusted to this policy, either by altering their processes or by shifting their product portfolio in a 
way that likely negative impacts of energy policy are avoided. In such a situation, the current 
level of policy relevance has little impacts on changes in competitiveness. Finally, we use cross-
section data (with information on only two points in time) which impedes any analysis of long-
term impacts or dynamic effects of policies. Future research should hence address these 
shortcomings of our study. 
For energy policy in the three countries considered, our results imply that a more rigid 
approach as used in Germany (high energy taxes, strict and costly regulation) does not seem to 
imply a loss in competitiveness compared to neighbouring countries with similar economic 
structures and a somewhat (Austria) or significantly (Switzerland) less strict approach. This 
finding is however bound to the specific period of our study. Between 2012 and 2014, energy 
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prices tended to fall, and additional costs of regulatory measures such as the CO2 emission 
trading system were low. In addition, some of the particularly costly measures of German energy 
policy, the EEG scheme to subsidising investment in renewable energy sources by an increase in 
electricity price mainly affected consumers whereas firms with huge energy demand and own 
electricity production facilities have largely been exempted from the cost burden. The higher 
costs for consumer stimulated demand for energy-efficient products, which in turn had an 
indirect effect on exports of firms adopting energy efficient technologies as domestic customers 
tend to show a higher willingness to pay for energy-efficiently produced products than customers 
abroad under a less strict energy policy regime. 
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Appendix 
Table 6: Variable definition, measurement and descriptive statistics 
Variable Definition/measurement Mean Std. d. Min Max 
Dependent variable      
Export share in t Percentage share of exports in total sales in t 19.25 30.65 0.00 100.00 
Export activity in t Firm did sell products to customers abroad in t 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Export share in t if export 
activity>0 
Share of exports in total sales 38.27 33.76 0.02 100.00 
Change in export share (Export share in t) - (export share in t-2) 0.37 9.36 -98.00 100.00 
Change in export volume ln(1+exports in t in €) - ln(1+exports in t-2 in €) 0.04 2.39 -17.93 19.94 
Independent variables      
Taxation Relevance of energy-related taxes during t-2 to t (1: 
somewhat or high, 0: not) 
0.53 0.50 0 1 
Regulation Relevance of energy-related regulations during t-2 
to t (1: somewhat or high, 0: not) 
0.37 0.48 0 1 
Standards/voluntary 
agreements 
Relevance of energy-related standards / voluntary 
agreem. during t-2 to t (1: somewhat or high, 0: not)
0.31 0.46 0 1 
Public subsidies Relevance of energy-related public subsidies during 
t-2 to t (1: somewhat or high, 0: not) 
0.34 0.47 0 1 
Demand Relevance of demand for energy efficient products 
during t-2 to t (1: somewhat or high, 0: not) 
0.26 0.44 0 1 
Adoption of energy 
technology 
Firm introduced new energy technologies during t-2 
to t 
0.47 0.50 0 1 
Key motive: efficiency 
gains  
Increasing energy efficiency was a key motive for 
energy technology adoption 
0.25 0.43 0 1 
Key motive: others  Increasing energy efficiency was not a key motive 
for energy technology adoption 
0.22 0.41 0 1 
Efficiency gains achieved Adoption of new energy technologies led to an 
increase in energy efficiency 
0.29 0.45 0 1 
Development of energy 
technology 
Firm developed new energy technologies during t-2 
and t for sale on the market  
0.07 0.26 0 1 
Export share in t-2 Percentage share of exports in total sales in t-2 14.29 27.34 0.00 100.00 
Export activity in t-2 Firm did sell products to customers abroad in t-2 0.41 0.49 0 1 
Energy intensity in t-2 Share of energy expenditure in total sales in t-2 2.22 6.39 0.00 280.00 
Energy source: own 
renewables 
Firm used electric energy generated from own 
renewable sources during t-2 and t 
0.03 0.17 0 1 
Energy source: oil Firm used oil as energy source during t-2 and t 0.05 0.23 0 1 
Energy source: natural 
gas 
Firm used natural gas as energy source during t-2 
and t 
0.09 0.28 0 1 
Other product innovation Firm introduced product innovations during t-2 and 
t (other than development of energy technologies) 
0.38 0.49 0 1 
Other process innovation Firm introduced process innovations during t-2 and 
t (other than new energy technologies) 
0.13 0.34 0 1 
Size Number of employees (full-time equivalents) in t, ln 3.43 1.01 0.00 6.24 
Age Firm age in years in t, ln 3.75 1.62 0.00 11.63 
Foreign owned Firm is owned by a foreign company 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Domestic group Firm is part of a domestic enterprise group  0.22 0.42 0 1 
Unit labour cost Relation between labour cost and value added in t 0.43 0.53 0.00 15.00 
Material share Share of material and service input in total sales in t 0.31 0.25 0.00 1.00 
Relative labour 
productivity t-2 
Value added per FTE employee in t-2, divided by 
labour productivity in a firms 2-digit industry, ln 
0.61 1.80 -7.89 63.58 
Switzerland Firm located in Switzerland 0.08 0.28 0 1 
Austria Firm located in Austria 0.40 0.49 0 1 
 32 
Table 7: Impact of energy policy relevance and energy technology adoption on export 
performance of firms: estimation results of probit models on the probability to export 
Dep. var.: export activity in t (1) (2) (3) 
 m.E. std.err. m.E. std.err. m.E. std.err. 
Energy policy relevance          
Taxation 0.028 (0.029)  0.029 (0.029)  0.030 (0.029)  
Regulation 0.013 (0.034)  0.012 (0.034)  0.013 (0.034)  
Standards/voluntary agreements -0.006 (0.034)  -0.005 (0.034)  -0.006 (0.034)  
Subsidies 0.005 (0.032)  0.008 (0.032)  0.008 (0.032)  
Demand -0.069 (0.033) ** -0.068 (0.033) ** -0.068 (0.033) ** 
Energy technology adoption          
Adoption of energy technology 0.066 (0.029) **       
Key motive: efficiency gains     0.050 (0.044)     
Key motive: others     0.085 (0.038) **    
Adoption lead to higher efficiency    -0.008 (0.039)     
Efficiency: motive & achieved       0.049 (0.040)  
Efficiency: motive, not achieved       0.034 (0.052)  
Efficiency: no motive & achieved       0.067 (0.041)  
Efficiency: no motive, not achieved       0.095 (0.042) ** 
Energy technology development -0.017 (0.059)  -0.014 (0.059)  -0.013 (0.059)  
Control variables          
Export share in t-21) 0.840 (0.012) *** 0.841 (0.012) *** 0.841 (0.012) *** 
Energy intensity in t-21) 0.001 (0.002)  0.001 (0.002)  0.001 (0.002)  
Energy source: own renewables -0.024 (0.076)  -0.017 (0.076)  -0.018 (0.076)  
Energy source: oil 0.017 (0.061)  0.015 (0.061)  0.014 (0.062)  
Energy source: natural gas -0.121 (0.047) *** -0.122 (0.047) *** -0.122 (0.047) *** 
Other product innovation 0.163 (0.026) *** 0.164 (0.027) *** 0.164 (0.027) *** 
Other process innovation -0.052 (0.040)  -0.052 (0.040)  -0.053 (0.040)  
Size 0.009 (0.013)  0.009 (0.013)  0.009 (0.013)  
Age  0.042 (0.009) *** 0.042 (0.009) *** 0.043 (0.009) *** 
Foreign group 0.108 (0.041) ** 0.108 (0.041) ** 0.108 (0.041) ** 
Domestic group 0.047 (0.032)  0.048 (0.032)  0.047 (0.032)  
Unit labour cost1) 0.000 (0.002)  0.000 (0.002)  0.000 (0.002)  
Material share1) 0.153 (0.066) ** 0.153 (0.066) ** 0.154 (0.066) ** 
Relative labour productivity t-21) 0.008 (0.005)  0.008 (0.005)  0.008 (0.005)  
Austria 0.112 (0.062) * 0.116 (0.062) * 0.115 (0.062)  
Switzerland -0.098 (0.037) *** -0.097 (0.037) *** -0.096 (0.037) *** 
No. of observations 4,221 4,221 4,221 
Log-Likelihood 3,872 3,873 3,873 
***, **, *: significant at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 level. 
Each model includes 25 industry dummies which are jointly significant. 
1) Missing values are set to 0 and dummy variables indicating missing observations have been included. 
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Table 8: Impact of energy policy relevance and energy technology adoption on the export 
performance: estimation results of OLS models on the export share of exporting firms 
(1) (2) Dep. var.: export share in t of firms with export activities 
coeff. std.err. coeff. std.err. 
Energy policy relevance       
Taxation 0.546 (0.954)  0.595 (0.953)  
Regulation 2.135 (1.071) ** 2.117 (1.070) ** 
Standards/voluntary agreements -1.131 (1.069)  -1.245 (1.069)  
Subsidies -0.450 (1.007)  -0.335 (1.007)  
Demand -0.961 (1.034)  -0.985 (1.033)  
Energy technology adoption       
Adoption of energy technology       
Key motive: efficiency gains  -0.002 (1.434)     
Key motive: others  -0.329 (1.326)     
Adoption lead to higher efficiency -0.412 (1.203)     
Efficiency: motive of adoption & achieved    0.338 (1.254)  
Efficiency: motive of adoption, but not achieved    -2.136 (1.682)  
Efficiency: no motive of adoption, but achieved    -2.065 (1.397)  
Efficiency: no motive of adoption, not achieved    1.252 (1.477)  
Energy technology development 0.083 (1.558)  0.108 (1.556)  
Control variables       
Export share in t-21) 0.852 (0.015) *** 0.853 (0.015) *** 
Energy intensity in t-21) -0.075 (0.057)  -0.075 (0.057)  
Energy source: own renewables -2.841 (2.325)  -3.044 (2.324)  
Energy source: oil -1.713 (1.680)  -1.625 (1.678)  
Energy source: natural gas -3.282 (1.846) * -3.309 (1.844) * 
Other product innovation 1.881 (0.948) ** 1.951 (0.947) ** 
Other process innovation -0.456 (1.304)  -0.502 (1.303)  
Size -0.349 (0.448)  -0.348 (0.448)  
Age  -0.039 (0.323)  -0.021 (0.322)  
Foreign group 9.651 (1.302) *** 9.595 (1.300) *** 
Domestic group 3.163 (1.051) *** 3.098 (1.050) *** 
Unit labour cost1) -1.339 (1.379)  -1.470 (1.378)  
Material share1) 6.397 (2.493) *** 6.573 (2.491) *** 
Relative labour productivity t-21) 0.476 (0.349)  0.491 (0.348)  
Austria 2.816 (1.405) ** 2.886 (1.403) ** 
Switzerland 4.867 (1.438) *** 5.106 (1.440) *** 
Constant 7.040 (4.434)  6.618 (4.432)  
No. of observations 2,057 2,057 
R2 adjusted 0,717 0,709 
***, **, *: significant at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 level. 
Each model includes 25 industry dummies which are jointly significant. 
1) Missing values are set to 0 and dummy variables indicating missing observations have been included. 
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Table 9: Impact of energy policy relevance and energy technology adoption on change in export 
performance of exporting firms: estimation results of OLS models 
Dependent variable: Change in export share from t-2 to t Change in export volume from t-2 to t 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
 coeff. std.err. coeff. std.err. coeff. std.err. coeff. std.err. 
Energy policy relevance             
Taxation -0.021 (0.386)  -0.015 (0.386)  -0.024 (0.097)  -0.018 (0.098)  
Regulation 0.600 (0.445)  0.604 (0.445)  0.149 (0.112)  0.155 (0.112)  
Standards/voluntary agreements 0.030 (0.449)  0.023 (0.450)  -0.093 (0.114)  -0.089 (0.114)  
Subsidies 0.057 (0.415)  -0.034 (0.417)  0.059 (0.105)  0.065 (0.106)  
Demand -0.701 (0.433)  -0.703 (0.433)  -0.226 (0.110) ** -0.225 (0.110) ** 
Energy technology adoption        
Adoption of energy technology 0.285 (0.392)   0.082 (0.099)    
Efficiency: motive & achieved   0.505 (0.513)    -0.005 (0.130)  
Efficiency: motive, not achieved   1.069 (0.679)    0.047 (0.172)  
Efficiency: no motive & achieved   -0.906 (0.576)    0.061 (0.146)  
Efficiency: no motive, not 
achieved   0.667 (0.572)    0.224 (0.144)  
Energy technology development 0.470 (0.712)  0.474 (0.712)  -0.206 (0.181)  -0.193 (0.181)  
Control variables        
Export share in t-21) -0.070 (0.007) *** -0.070 (0.007) *** -0.010 (0.002) *** -0.010 (0.002) *** 
Energy intensity in t-21) -0.072 (0.040) * -0.073 (0.040) * -0.021 (0.010) ** -0.021 (0.010) ** 
Energy source: own renewables -0.747 (0.947)  -0.813 (0.948)  -0.098 (0.239)  -0.084 (0.239)  
Energy source: oil 0.319 (0.719)  0.290 (0.719)  0.011 (0.182)  0.008 (0.182)  
Energy source: natural gas -1.621 (0.640) ** -1.594 (0.640) ** -0.490 (0.163) *** -0.481 (0.163) *** 
Other product innovation 0.619 (0.394)  0.639 (0.394)  0.313 (0.100) *** 0.319 (0.100) *** 
Other process innovation -0.066 (0.557)  -0.082 (0.557)  -0.250 (0.141) * -0.257 (0.141) * 
Size -0.316 (0.194)  -0.318 (0.193)  -0.134 (0.048) *** -0.132 (0.048) *** 
Age  0.189 (0.125)  0.189 (0.125)  0.063 (0.032) ** 0.065 (0.032) ** 
Foreign group 0.514 (0.637)  0.486 (0.637)  -0.239 (0.162)  -0.237 (0.162)  
Domestic group 0.267 (0.437)  0.248 (0.437)  0.005 (0.111)  -0.001 (0.111)  
Unit labour cost1) -0.517 (0.339)  -0.509 (0.339)  -0.017 (0.085)  -0.020 (0.085)  
Material share1) 2.181 (0.951) ** 2.112 (0.951) ** 0.146 (0.240)  0.142 (0.240)  
Relative labour productivity t-21) 0.053 (0.090)  0.055 (0.089)  0.007 (0.023)  0.007 (0.023)  
Austria 1.589 (0.607) *** 1.612 (0.608) *** 0.208 (0.156)  0.226 (0.156)  
Switzerland 0.514 (0.613)  0.615 (0.614)  0.084 (0.155)  0.090 (0.156)  
Constant 3.396 (1.431) ** 3.400 (1.433) ** 0.630 (0.353) * 0.595 (0.353) * 
No. of observations 3,191 3,191 3,296 3,296 
R2 adjusted 0.034 0.036 0.021 0.020 
***, **, *: significant at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 level. 
Each model includes 25 industry dummies which are jointly significant. 
1) Missing values are set to 0 and dummy variables indicating missing observations have been included. 
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Table 10: Impact of combinations of energy policy relevance and energy technology adoption 
patterns on export performance of firms: estimation results of probit and OLS models 
export activity in t 
(probit) 
export share for ex-
port activity >0 (OLS)
Dependent variable:
m.E. std.err. coeff. std.err. 
Energy policy & adoption motives / impacts       
Taxation & motive efficiency + increase in efficiency 0.049 (0.065)  0.208 (1.777)  
Regulation & motive efficiency + increase in efficiency -0.119 (0.075)  4.818 (2.006) ** 
Stand./vol. agr. & motive efficiency + increase in efficiency 0.038 (0.071)  -0.299 (1.944)  
Subsidies & motive efficiency + increase in efficiency 0.109 (0.059) * -1.991 (1.855)  
Demand & motive efficiency + increase in efficiency -0.073 (0.071)  -1.121 (1.913)  
Taxation & motive efficiency + no increase in efficiency 0.010 (0.097)  0.492 (3.004)  
Regulation & motive efficiency + no increase in efficiency 0.017 (0.119)  -1.817 (3.821)  
Stand./vol. agr. & motive efficiency + no increase in efficiency -0.161 (0.115)  5.288 (3.369)  
Subsidies & motive efficiency + no increase in efficiency 0.082 (0.090)  -1.057 (2.880)  
Demand & motive efficiency + no increase in efficiency -0.032 (0.111)  -4.294 (3.461)  
Taxation & no motive efficiency + increase in efficiency 0.156 (0.064) ** 0.542 (2.276)  
Regulation & no mot. efficiency + increase in efficiency -0.169 (0.092) * -0.723 (2.913)  
Stand./vol. agr. & no motive efficiency + increase in efficiency -0.031 (0.090)  1.562 (2.772)  
Subsidies & no motive efficiency + increase in efficiency 0.120 (0.077)  0.242 (2.761)  
Demand & no motive efficiency + increase in efficiency -0.067 (0.084)  -2.426 (2.579)  
Taxation & no motive efficiency, no increase in efficiency 0.101 (0.076)  -1.210 (2.533)  
Regulation & no motive efficiency, no increase  in efficiency 0.026 (0.107)  5.617 (3.360) * 
Stand./vol. agr. & no motive efficiency, no increase in efficiency -0.058 (0.112)  -2.426 (3.284)  
Subsidies & no motive efficiency, no increase in efficiency 0.051 (0.089)  1.001 (2.848)  
Demand & no motive efficiency, no increase in efficiency -0.066 (0.097)  0.388 (2.781)  
Taxation & no adoption -0.015 (0.038)  1.294 (1.276)  
Regulation & no adoption 0.109 (0.045) ** 1.803 (1.647)  
Stand./voluntary agreements & no adoption 0.030 (0.051)  -4.882 (1.852) *** 
Subsidies & no adoption -0.112 (0.050) ** 0.780 (1.712)  
Demand & no adoption -0.062 (0.049)  0.306 (1.715)  
Energy technology development -0.006 (0.060)  0.070 (1.559)  
Control variables      
Export share in t-21) 0.847 (0.011) *** 0.853 (0.016) *** 
Energy intensity in t-21) 0.001 (0.002)  -0.073 (0.057)  
Energy source: own renewables -0.025 (0.077)  -2.900 (2.335)  
Energy source: oil 0.021 (0.062)  -1.590 (1.690)  
Energy source: natural gas -0.123 (0.047) *** -3.303 (1.853) * 
Other product innovation 0.172 (0.027) *** 1.681 (0.950) * 
Other process innovation -0.075 (0.039) * -0.089 (1.250)  
Size 0.009 (0.013)  -0.409 (0.450)  
Age  0.046 (0.009) *** -0.087 (0.322)  
Foreign group 0.103 (0.041) ** 9.540 (1.308) *** 
Domestic group 0.046 (0.032)  3.179 (1.055) *** 
Unit labour cost1) 0.000 (0.002)  -1.398 (1.384)  
Material share1) 0.155 (0.067) ** 6.642 (2.508) *** 
Relative labour productivity t-21) 0.008 (0.006)  0.489 (0.350)  
Austria 0.094 (0.064)  3.229 (1.415) ** 
Switzerland -0.100 (0.037) *** 4.889 (1.441) *** 
Constant    7.023 (4.456)  
No. of observations 4,221 2,057 
R2 adjusted    0.709 
Log-Likelihood 3,894    
***, **, *: significant at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 level. 
Each model includes 25 industry dummies which are jointly significant. 
1) Missing values are set to 0 and dummy variables indicating missing observations have been included. 
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Table 11: Impact of combinations of energy policy relevance and energy technology adoption 
patterns on change in export performance of firms: estimation results of OLS models 
change in export share 
from t-2 to t 
change in export 
volume from t-2 to t 
Dependent variable:
coeff. std.err. coeff. std.err. 
Energy policy relevance & adoption motives and/ impacts       
Taxation & motive efficiency + increase in efficiency -0.378 (0.757)  -0.047 (0.193)  
Regulation & motive efficiency + increase in efficiency 0.774 (0.896)  -0.008 (0.227)  
Stand./vol. agr. & motive efficiency + increase in efficiency 1.187 (0.858)  -0.080 (0.218)  
Subsidies & motive efficiency + increase in efficiency 0.839 (0.801)  0.275 (0.203)  
Demand & motive efficiency + increase in efficiency -1.839 (0.853) ** -0.245 (0.216)  
Taxation & motive efficiency + no increase in efficiency -0.106 (1.189)  -0.042 (0.301)  
Regulation & motive efficiency + no increase in efficiency -0.814 (1.558)  -0.261 (0.389)  
Stand./vol. agr. & motive efficiency + no increase in efficiency 2.357 (1.454)  -0.345 (0.365)  
Subsidies & motive efficiency + no increase in efficiency 0.971 (1.276)  0.465 (0.323)  
Demand & motive efficiency + no increase in efficiency -0.610 (1.413)  0.034 (0.353)  
Taxation & no motive efficiency + increase in efficiency 0.030 (0.929)  0.146 (0.235)  
Regulation & no mot. efficiency + increase in efficiency -0.286 (1.252)  -0.250 (0.311)  
Stand./vol. agr. & no motive efficiency + increase in efficiency 0.773 (1.233)  0.212 (0.309)  
Subsidies & no motive efficiency + increase in efficiency -0.950 (1.170)  0.030 (0.297)  
Demand & no motive efficiency + increase in efficiency -1.467 (1.157)  -0.173 (0.291)  
Taxation & no motive efficiency, no increase in efficiency -0.364 (1.026)  -0.104 (0.255)  
Regulation & no motive efficiency, no increase  in efficiency 2.149 (1.394)  0.063 (0.346)  
Stand./vol. agr. & no motive efficiency, no increase in efficiency -1.164 (1.334)  -0.184 (0.337)  
Subsidies & no motive efficiency, no increase in efficiency 0.447 (1.210)  0.635 (0.301) ** 
Demand & no motive efficiency, no increase in efficiency 0.279 (1.193)  -0.273 (0.300)  
Taxation & no adoption 0.185 (0.507)  -0.048 (0.128)  
Regulation & no adoption 0.832 (0.663)  0.426 (0.169) ** 
Stand./voluntary agreements & no adoption -1.148 (0.721)  -0.070 (0.184)  
Subsidies & no adoption -0.411 (0.653)  -0.301 (0.166) * 
Demand & no adoption -0.148 (0.657)  -0.212 (0.168)  
Energy technology development 0.554 (0.713)  -0.203 (0.182)  
Control variables       
Export share in t-21) -0.070 (0.007) *** -0.010 (0.002) *** 
Energy intensity in t-21) -0.068 (0.040) * -0.020 (0.010) * 
Energy source: own renewables -0.795 (0.950)  -0.105 (0.239)  
Energy source: oil 0.261 (0.721)  0.005 (0.182)  
Energy source: natural gas -1.682 (0.641) *** -0.500 (0.163) *** 
Other product innovation 0.629 (0.393)  0.321 (0.100) *** 
Other process innovation -0.043 (0.542)  -0.260 (0.137) * 
Size -0.312 (0.194)  -0.132 (0.049) *** 
Age  0.181 (0.125)  0.068 (0.031) ** 
Foreign group 0.466 (0.638)  -0.244 (0.163)  
Domestic group 0.290 (0.438)  0.013 (0.111)  
Unit labour cost1) -0.504 (0.339)  -0.019 (0.085)  
Material share1) 1.982 (0.953) ** 0.113 (0.241)  
Relative labour productivity t-21) 0.062 (0.090)  0.006 (0.023)  
Austria 1.628 (0.612) *** 0.172 (0.157)  
Switzerland 0.557 (0.614)  0.056 (0.156)  
Constant 3.656 (1.434) ** 0.656 (0.354) * 
No. of observations 3,191 3,296 
R2 adjusted 0.035 0.020 
***, **, *: significant at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 level. 
Each model includes 25 industry dummies which are jointly significant. 
1) Missing values are set to 0 and dummy variables indicating missing observations have been included. 
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Table 12: Impact of combinations of energy policy relevance and energy technology adoption patterns on export performance of firms: estimation 
results for an alternative measurement of policy relevance (considering ‘highly relevant’ policies only) 
export share in t 
(tobit) 
export activity in t 
(probit) 
export share for export 
activity >0 (OLS) 
change in export share 
betw. t-2 and t (OLS) 
Dependent variable:
Energy policy relevance &  
adoption motives / impacts coeff. std.err. coeff. std.err. coeff. std.err. coeff. std.err. 
Taxation & motive efficiency + increase in efficiency 1.17 (2.352)  0.09 (0.073)  0.78 (2.059)  1.47 (0.895)  
Regulation & motive efficiency + increase in efficiency 3.91 (2.682)  -0.02 (0.089)  5.46 (2.304) ** -0.43 (1.090)  
Standards/voluntary agreem. & motive efficiency + increase in efficiency 2.43 (2.946)  -0.04 (0.100)  -0.12 (2.556)  2.38 (1.183) ** 
Subsidies & motive efficiency + increase in efficiency 0.74 (2.532)  0.09 (0.076)  -2.12 (2.194)  -0.51 (1.010)  
Demand & motive efficiency + increase in efficiency -1.99 (3.321)  -0.11 (0.104)  2.25 (3.087)  -0.63 (1.260)  
Taxation & motive efficiency + no increase in efficiency -2.95 (4.413)  -0.09 (0.132)  -0.94 (4.098)  0.78 (1.598)  
Regulation & motive efficiency + no increase in efficiency 3.97 (5.169)  0.15 (0.137)  0.73 (4.638)  -0.32 (2.093)  
Standards/voluntary agr. & motive efficiency + no increase in efficiency 0.35 (4.586)  -0.14 (0.152)  2.35 (4.069)  2.17 (1.849)  
Subsidies & motive efficiency + no increase in efficiency -2.93 (4.004)  -0.07 (0.120)  -4.14 (3.492)  -0.51 (1.608)  
Demand & motive efficiency + no increase in efficiency 2.79 (4.296)  0.02 (0.118)  2.07 (3.840)  1.24 (1.746)  
Taxation & no motive efficiency + increase in efficiency 3.88 (3.413)  0.25 (0.075) ** 1.04 (2.919)  -0.22 (1.298)  
Regulation & no mot. efficiency + increase in efficiency -4.93 (4.349)  -0.12 (0.123)  -4.65 (3.889)  -0.02 (1.867)  
Standards/voluntary agr. & no motive efficiency + increase in efficiency -9.44 (4.905) * -0.09 (0.142)  -5.24 (4.478)  0.30 (1.926)  
Subsidies & no motive efficiency + increase in efficiency 5.68 (4.281)  0.13 (0.107)  5.64 (3.813)  0.41 (1.704)  
Demand & no motive efficiency + increase in efficiency -2.70 (5.476)  0.05 (0.147)  -1.34 (5.000)  -0.86 (2.195)  
Taxation & no motive efficiency, no increase in efficiency 9.30 (3.684) ** 0.25 (0.077) ** 3.95 (3.258)  0.32 (1.363)  
Regulation & no motive efficiency, no increase  in efficiency 5.86 (5.793)  -0.12 (0.176)  11.72 (5.330) ** -0.11 (2.313)  
Standards/voluntary agr. & no motive efficiency, no increase in efficiency -5.18 (5.826)  -0.08 (0.198)  -5.28 (5.038)  0.46 (2.292)  
Subsidies & no motive efficiency, no increase in efficiency -4.32 (4.600)  -0.13 (0.143)  -2.84 (4.265)  -0.97 (1.652)  
Demand & no motive efficiency, no increase in efficiency -2.93 (4.910)  -0.11 (0.144)  -3.15 (4.506)  1.00 (1.926)  
Taxation & no adoption 1.84 (2.152)  -0.02 (0.060)  0.81 (2.077)  -0.58 (0.775)  
Regulation & no adoption 1.75 (3.141)  0.11 (0.076)  1.19 (2.999)  2.84 (1.231) ** 
Standards/voluntary agreements & no adoption -2.35 (3.739)  -0.13 (0.104)  -0.05 (3.674)  -0.72 (1.353)  
Subsidies & no adoption -1.30 (3.278)  -0.03 (0.091)  -3.09 (3.239)  -2.05 (1.158) * 
Demand & no adoption -4.53 (3.715)  -0.11 (0.107)  -0.53 (3.717)  0.29 (1.232)  
Energy technology development 4.25 (1.791) ** -0.01 (0.060)  -0.08 (1.561)  0.34 (0.712)  
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export share in t 
(tobit) 
export activity in t 
(probit) 
export share for export 
activity >0 (OLS) 
change in export share 
betw. t-2 and t (OLS) 
Dependent variable:
coeff. std.err. coeff. std.err. coeff. std.err. coeff. std.err. 
Control variables             
Export share in t-21) 0.98 (0.018) *** 0.84 (0.012) *** 0.85 (0.016) *** -0.07 (0.007) *** 
Energy intensity in t-21) -0.07 (0.069)  0.00 (0.002)  -0.09 (0.058)  -0.07 (0.040) * 
Energy source: own renewables -3.54 (2.573)  -0.03 (0.078)  -2.49 (2.338)  -0.63 (0.952)  
Energy source: oil -1.69 (1.913)  0.03 (0.061)  -1.84 (1.697)  0.34 (0.723)  
Energy source: natural gas -3.42 (1.819) * -0.10 (0.047) ** -3.03 (1.852)  -1.56 (0.641) ** 
Other product innovation 7.47 (1.002) *** 0.17 (0.026) *** 1.99 (0.943) ** 0.59 (0.389)  
Other process innovation -0.28 (1.301)  -0.07 (0.038) * 0.31 (1.203)  0.04 (0.522)  
Size 0.25 (0.477)  0.01 (0.013)  -0.26 (0.452)  -0.30 (0.194)  
Age  1.67 (0.332) *** 0.05 (0.009) *** -0.19 (0.318)  0.17 (0.123)  
Foreign group 10.19 (1.470) *** 0.10 (0.041) ** 9.76 (1.303) *** 0.40 (0.639)  
Domestic group 2.19 (1.143) * 0.05 (0.032)  3.07 (1.055) *** 0.30 (0.439)  
Unit labour cost1) 0.42 (1.030)  0.00 (0.002)  -1.53 (1.383)  -0.49 (0.341)  
Material share1) 9.07 (2.555) *** 0.15 (0.066) ** 6.76 (2.502) *** 2.09 (0.955) ** 
Relative labour productivity t-21) 0.55 (0.248) ** 0.01 (0.006)  0.47 (0.353)  0.06 (0.090)  
Austria 6.95 (1.643) *** 0.12 (0.063) * 2.81 (1.405) ** 1.72 (0.610) *** 
Switzerland 3.66 (1.450) ** -0.10 (0.037) *** 5.08 (1.434) *** 0.52 (0.612)  
Constant -32.36 (4.073) ***    7.11 (4.454)  3.48 (1.436) ** 
No. of observations 4,090 4,221 2,057 3,191 
No. of censored observations 2,033    
R2 adjusted   0.708 0.033 
Log likelihood 4,333 3,888   
***, **, *: significant at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 level. 
Each model includes 25 industry dummies which are jointly significant. 
1) Missing values are set to 0 and dummy variables indicating missing observations have been included. 
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Table 13: Matching results on export performance by combinations of energy policy relevance 
and key motive of energy technology adoption, by country 
Export activity in t Export share in t  
(all firms) 
Export share in t 
(exporters only) 
Change in export 
share betw. t-2 and t 
Country Energy 
policy 
Effi-
ciency 
motive Effect sign. Effect sign. Effect sign. Effect sign. 
Energy taxes      
GER yes yes -3.0% 0.573 -0.6% 0.737 1.8% 0.503 0.4% 0.314 
SUI yes yes -7.8% 0.292 -3.0% 0.495 0.7% 0.890 1.1% 0.174 
AUT yes yes 0.2% 0.967 0.3% 0.965 0.2% 0.976 -0.7% 0.584 
GER yes no 0.4% 0.940 0.4% 0.891 0.3% 0.946 -0.4% 0.463 
SUI yes no 5.6% 0.325 3.6% 0.403 1.4% 0.801 1.2% 0.622 
AUT yes no 2.7% 0.722 3.7% 0.645 2.8% 0.733 0.4% 0.824 
GER no yes 3.9% 0.498 1.0% 0.775 -0.5% 0.930 2.0% 0.412 
SUI no yes -4.3% 0.683 -9.0% 0.015** -6.1% 0.206 0.2% 0.839 
AUT no yes -7.5% 0.463 -8.7% 0.243 -6.7% 0.451 0.5% 0.662 
GER no no -6.2% 0.161 -2.6% 0.196 -1.4% 0.696 0.0% 0.960 
SUI no no -0.6% 0.938 3.2% 0.674 7.0% 0.431 -0.9% 0.506 
AUT no no 11.1% 0.050** -0.7% 0.924 -6.9% 0.350 0.2% 0.897 
Energy-related regulation       
GER yes yes -6.0% 0.291 1.7% 0.598 6.5% 0.192 3.0% 0.278 
SUI yes yes -0.4% 0.970 -2.8% 0.550 -5.8% 0.521 1.3% 0.093* 
AUT yes yes -17.8% 0.175 1.4% 0.902 14.4% 0.147 -0.4% 0.650 
GER yes no -4.5% 0.402 -1.4% 0.522 -0.4% 0.904 0.1% 0.850 
SUI yes no 5.7% 0.471 2.6% 0.618 -0.4% 0.959 4.9% 0.396 
AUT yes no 20.1% 0.000*** 8.1% 0.395 -1.6% 0.866 -2.4% 0.051* 
GER no yes 4.9% 0.192 1.8% 0.410 0.5% 0.869 0.6% 0.231 
SUI no yes -4.5% 0.497 -7.9% 0.015** -8.9% 0.049** -0.9% 0.268 
AUT no yes -1.2% 0.854 -0.7% 0.910 -0.2% 0.978 -0.4% 0.741 
GER no no 2.1% 0.529 -1.2% 0.437 -3.2% 0.199 -0.2% 0.656 
SUI no no -1.3% 0.839 -0.2% 0.970 1.0% 0.868 -0.9% 0.323 
AUT no no 1.7% 0.800 -5.0% 0.434 -7.1% 0.303 1.2% 0.348 
Energy-related standards/voluntary agreements     
GER yes yes -2.2% 0.735 0.6% 0.816 1.9% 0.632 -0.8% 0.467 
SUI yes yes 5.2% 0.591 -3.6% 0.454 -11.3% 0.306 1.2% 0.106 
AUT yes yes -13.0% 0.335 4.9% 0.696 15.4% 0.146 -0.7% 0.483 
GER yes no -0.8% 0.895 0.6% 0.813 1.5% 0.684 -0.1% 0.895 
SUI yes no -3.4% 0.668 -0.5% 0.920 2.1% 0.746 0.3% 0.891 
AUT yes no 12.9% 0.016** 9.7% 0.265 3.7% 0.672 -0.2% 0.897 
GER no yes 1.1% 0.768 1.4% 0.482 1.7% 0.577 0.8% 0.346 
SUI no yes -1.0% 0.853 -2.7% 0.449 -3.2% 0.507 0.1% 0.932 
AUT no yes 6.6% 0.184 2.5% 0.697 -0.9% 0.898 -0.6% 0.626 
GER no no -1.3% 0.698 -1.0% 0.553 -1.1% 0.662 -0.3% 0.582 
SUI no no 5.6% 0.250 3.3% 0.388 1.3% 0.801 -0.2% 0.833 
AUT no no 18.5% 0.000*** 3.1% 0.738 -5.6% 0.564 -0.5% 0.716 
Subsidies for energy technologies        
GER yes yes 5.2% 0.269 3.0% 0.277 2.6% 0.512 0.9% 0.645 
SUI yes yes 2.2% 0.684 2.2% 0.579 1.2% 0.802 2.5% 0.054* 
AUT yes yes -15.4% 0.035** 0.7% 0.913 10.8% 0.126 0.0% 0.978 
GER yes no -2.5% 0.631 -0.2% 0.933 0.4% 0.919 -0.5% 0.417 
SUI yes no 4.0% 0.553 6.3% 0.208 7.6% 0.182 0.1% 0.960 
AUT yes no 10.8% 0.178 -15.1% 0.170 -22.1% 0.083* -1.6% 0.015** 
GER no yes -0.7% 0.842 1.3% 0.471 2.8% 0.301 0.9% 0.073* 
SUI no yes 0.9% 0.846 -0.9% 0.778 -0.1% 0.977 -1.2% 0.262 
AUT no yes 16.7% 0.000*** -2.8% 0.739 -12.1% 0.180 -1.8% 0.357 
GER no no 0.7% 0.842 -0.1% 0.947 -0.5% 0.859 -0.2% 0.754 
SUI no no 2.6% 0.581 2.2% 0.540 2.3% 0.622 -0.5% 0.565 
AUT no no 10.8% 0.051 -7.0% 0.313 -13.1% 0.086* 0.7% 0.726 
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Export activity in t Export share in t  
(all firms) 
Export share in t 
(exporters only) 
Change in export 
share betw. t-2 and t 
Country Energy 
policy 
Effi-
ciency 
result Effect sign. Effect sign. Effect sign. Effect sign. 
Demand for energy-efficient products       
GER yes yes -10.0% 0.106 -3.4% 0.139 0.2% 0.954 -0.5% 0.373 
SUI yes yes 9.7% 0.330 3.0% 0.728 -3.2% 0.804 1.8% 0.146 
AUT yes yes -34.5% 0.057* -13.2% 0.206 6.1% 0.383 -1.4% 0.039** 
GER yes no 7.6% 0.160 0.0% 0.985 -4.5% 0.113 0.6% 0.306 
SUI yes no -4.5% 0.514 0.1% 0.990 4.1% 0.578 -2.2% 0.281 
AUT yes no 13.9% 0.001*** 9.5% 0.580 2.1% 0.907 -2.1% 0.131 
GER no yes 2.7% 0.412 1.8% 0.328 1.4% 0.589 1.1% 0.129 
SUI no yes 1.0% 0.839 -1.0% 0.759 -2.3% 0.610 0.5% 0.639 
AUT no yes 2.0% 0.740 1.6% 0.815 0.7% 0.924 -0.1% 0.883 
GER no no -1.5% 0.655 -0.2% 0.897 0.5% 0.844 -0.5% 0.383 
SUI no no 3.4% 0.459 2.3% 0.506 0.8% 0.862 1.0% 0.523 
AUT no no 12.4% 0.051* -3.1% 0.681 -9.4% 0.240 2.0% 0.280 
***, **, *: significant at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 level. 
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Table 14: Matching results on export performance by combinations of energy policy relevance 
and efficiency results of energy technology adoption, by country 
Export activity in t Export share in t  
(all firms) 
Export share in t 
(exporters only) 
Change in export 
share betw. t-2 and t 
Country Energy 
policy 
Effi-
ciency 
result Effect sign. Effect sign. Effect sign. Effect sign. 
Energy taxes      
GER yes yes -1.6% 0.726 0.4% 0.834 2.0% 0.463 0.0% 0.971 
SUI yes yes 9.5% 0.217 6.5% 0.194 4.0% 0.446 -0.2% 0.823 
AUT yes yes 3.6% 0.463 -3.7% 0.618 -6.0% 0.480 -0.5% 0.689 
GER yes no 4.8% 0.286 1.6% 0.545 0.7% 0.876 0.2% 0.644 
SUI yes no 9.9% 0.194 -0.6% 0.898 -8.6% 0.188 -0.6% 0.898 
AUT yes no -10.2% 0.376 10.9% 0.311 20.8% 0.008*** 4.8% 0.198 
GER no yes -0.5% 0.917 -0.1% 0.972 0.1% 0.989 -0.7% 0.725 
SUI no yes 2.6% 0.675 2.6% 0.643 3.0% 0.662 2.6% 0.643 
AUT no yes -3.5% 0.738 -1.4% 0.873 0.4% 0.966 -0.5% 0.564 
GER no no -7.4% 0.299 -2.7% 0.359 -1.5% 0.704 3.5% 0.260 
SUI no no -0.3% 0.972 -4.0% 0.519 -4.8% 0.634 -4.0% 0.519 
AUT no no 8.3% 0.485 -7.2% 0.501 -15.4% 0.230 2.6% 0.158 
Energy-related regulation       
GER yes yes -6.7% 0.172 0.0% 0.986 4.1% 0.242 1.0% 2.000 
SUI yes yes 3.5% 0.659 -1.1% 0.817 -5.6% 0.472 0.6% 0.450 
AUT yes yes -8.8% 0.531 -9.0% 0.260 -6.6% 0.412 0.1% 0.940 
GER yes no -5.8% 0.281 0.5% 0.875 3.9% 0.431 0.9% 0.143 
SUI yes no 6.6% 0.290 5.8% 0.216 4.9% 0.384 5.8% 0.216 
AUT yes no -11.6% 0.462 7.7% 0.639 17.3% 0.173 -1.9% 0.269 
GER no yes 3.7% 0.290 -0.2% 0.900 -2.1% 0.420 -0.4% 0.540 
SUI no yes 4.8% 0.332 0.8% 0.820 -1.9% 0.702 0.8% 0.820 
AUT no yes 5.4% 0.332 -1.1% 0.855 -4.4% 0.507 -2.2% 0.123 
GER no no 0.7% 0.855 -1.9% 0.346 -4.1% 0.216 0.5% 0.495 
SUI no no -1.0% 0.877 -4.4% 0.313 -5.8% 0.397 -4.4% 0.313 
AUT no no 3.9% 0.718 5.4% 0.632 4.3% 0.724 3.1% 0.115 
Energy-related standards/voluntary agreements     
GER yes yes 1.0% 0.866 -0.1% 0.972 -0.2% 0.956 -0.7% 0.235 
SUI yes yes -0.8% 0.925 0.7% 0.907 1.1% 0.908 0.6% 0.383 
AUT yes yes -7.7% 0.646 -4.6% 0.649 -1.7% 0.875 2.1% 0.546 
GER yes no 1.1% 0.848 1.9% 0.543 1.9% 0.665 0.7% 0.145 
SUI yes no -4.9% 0.517 0.0% 0.999 5.5% 0.462 0.0% 0.999 
AUT yes no -6.1% 0.606 2.8% 0.817 7.4% 0.570 1.7% 0.436 
GER no yes -1.4% 0.674 -0.6% 0.697 -0.7% 0.772 -0.6% 0.460 
SUI no yes 6.9% 0.110 4.7% 0.170 2.6% 0.569 4.7% 0.170 
AUT no yes 9.3% 0.076* -0.3% 0.959 -5.5% 0.381 -1.6% 0.151 
GER no no 0.8% 0.843 -0.2% 0.908 -0.9% 0.793 1.1% 0.227 
SUI no no 9.2% 0.102 -1.9% 0.634 -9.0% 0.115 -1.9% 0.634 
AUT no no -4.2% 0.695 0.9% 0.923 3.9% 0.680 4.8% 0.160 
Subsidies for energy technologies        
GER yes yes -2.3% 0.719 -1.5% 0.524 -2.0% 0.576 0.9% 0.588 
SUI yes yes 3.9% 0.536 5.5% 0.247 5.2% 0.305 -0.4% 0.796 
AUT yes yes -21.1% 0.135 -2.1% 0.821 11.9% 0.066* -1.7% 0.143 
GER yes no 2.0% 0.687 0.7% 0.792 -0.6% 0.871 -0.1% 0.919 
SUI yes no 3.7% 0.711 2.4% 0.711 1.3% 0.900 2.4% 0.711 
AUT yes no -10.7% 0.380 5.4% 0.645 15.2% 0.194 1.2% 0.504 
GER no yes -1.5% 0.657 0.1% 0.944 1.1% 0.637 -0.1% 0.815 
SUI no yes 2.6% 0.549 1.8% 0.578 1.6% 0.709 1.8% 0.578 
AUT no yes 5.9% 0.491 -3.2% 0.629 -7.4% 0.247 -0.9% 0.532 
GER no no 3.1% 0.430 -0.9% 0.648 -3.2% 0.278 0.1% 0.831 
SUI no no 7.5% 0.219 2.8% 0.564 2.0% 0.752 2.8% 0.564 
AUT no no 13.0% 0.016** 13.8% 0.216 7.9% 0.487 4.2% 0.143 
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Export activity in t Export share in t  
(all firms) 
Export share in t 
(exporters only) 
Change in export 
share betw. t-2 and t 
Country Energy 
policy 
Effi-
ciency 
result Effect sign. Effect sign. Effect sign. Effect sign. 
Demand for energy-efficient products       
GER yes yes -3.7% 0.533 -1.8% 0.395 -1.6% 0.607 -0.4% 0.325 
SUI yes yes -0.7% 0.936 -4.7% 0.266 -9.1% 0.224 0.1% 0.875 
AUT yes yes -34.1% 0.040** -12.5% 0.180 6.4% 0.306 -1.6% 0.030** 
GER yes no 0.9% 0.890 1.0% 0.696 1.5% 0.696 1.4% 0.035** 
SUI yes no 5.9% 0.522 -0.1% 0.993 -4.4% 0.634 -0.1% 0.993 
AUT yes no 7.3% 0.345 13.1% 0.393 10.4% 0.507 -1.1% 0.415 
GER no yes -0.4% 0.891 1.0% 0.517 2.0% 0.400 -0.2% 0.700 
SUI no yes 4.4% 0.307 3.0% 0.349 0.3% 0.950 3.0% 0.349 
AUT no yes 7.8% 0.159 3.2% 0.633 -0.9% 0.899 -1.4% 0.260 
GER no no -0.8% 0.831 -1.2% 0.541 -2.0% 0.507 0.4% 0.559 
SUI no no 4.4% 0.401 -1.2% 0.745 -3.7% 0.475 -1.2% 0.745 
AUT no no 2.7% 0.780 9.0% 0.467 9.4% 0.493 3.9% 0.170 
***, **, *: significant at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 level. 
 
 
